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I. INTRODUCTION
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1865).
Racial profiling by Texas law enforcement agencies is illegal.1 Texas,
nevertheless, continues to be haunted by its apparition.' Although it is
1. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.114(14) (Supp. 2002) (Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Major
Infraction Applicable to Any Member).
2. See, e.g., DWIGHT STEWARD & MOLLY TOTMAN, RACIAL PROFILING: DON'T MIND
1F I TAKE A LOOK, Do YA? AN EXAMINATION OF CONSENT SEARCHES AND CONTRABAND
Hrr RATES AT TEXAS TRAFFIC STOPS (2005); Cherie Bell, Report: Blacks Pulled Over at
Higher Rate; Group Only One in City Whose Stops Exceed Driver Representation, DALLAS
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forbidden de jure, does it persist de facto? By examining four years'
worth of data, consisting of over five million citations and warnings by the
Texas Department of Public Safety, this article examines statistically sig-
nificant differences in DPS stop and search rates, according to race; dem-
onstrates how this disparity can be introduced into forensic evidence; and
then proposes policy solutions to the problem of racial profiling. Three
statistical methods of testing for racial profiling are employed - cross tab-
ulation comparisons, one-tailed difference of proportions testing for sta-
tistical significance, and logit regressions to test for the odds of being
searched or holding contraband, if one is of a particular race or ethnicity.
Additionally, this article explores the framework of racial profiling, in-
cluding relevant literature, legislation, and litigation, as well as prominent
causal theories underlying the phenomenon. Issues addressed are: (1)
What is "racial profiling?" (2) Do the data tend to reflect racial profiling
by the Texas Department of Public Safety? (3) How may such data be
introduced into and used as evidence in court? (4) Finally, what can be
done to ameliorate or eliminate racial profiling?
Political philosopher Isaiah Berlin wrote of two types of liberty - posi-
tive and negative.3 Positive liberty consists of the bundle of rights
granted by the state to its citizens, e.g., civil rights.4 Negative liberty is
the right to be free from state interference within lawful pursuits, e.g.,
civil liberties.5 This article concerns itself with the latter - the right to
travel on the highway, unmolested by state action based upon race or
ethnicity.
In context of promises made by the United States Constitution, this
article also concerns itself with legal equality among the citizenry.6 Going
beyond the issue of defining "the people" under the rubric of the pream-
ble to the Constitution,7 the focus here is on racial equality under law, as
enforced by the state, and guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Does the promise of Equal Protection
mean what it says, or is it mere platitude? Since passage of the Four-
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 13, 2003, at T1; Michael Grabel, Racial Disparities in Searches Per-
sist; Dallas Traffic Stop Data Similar to Year Before; Doubts Dog Numbers, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Mar. 2, 2004, at B1; Jason Trahan, Hispanics Searched More Often; Views Differ
on Whether Traffic Stop Data Signal Racial Profiling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4,
2002, at Y1.
3. Isiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122-34 (1969).
4. Id. at 131-34.
5. Id. at 122-31.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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teenth Amendment almost a century-and-a-half ago, certain groups of
people have been under-included, or even excluded, from its promise.
In the annals of the republic known as the United States of America,
two diametrically opposing viewpoints of race have evolved, both reflec-
tive of differing attitudes of the same social fabric.9 They each concern
the human race; not the human race as a species, but what Professor
Glenn C. Loury calls "markers" of race - racial distinctions among the
human species. 10 From these so-called markers arise the dichotomy of
race awareness versus race benignity.11 Do we, and should we, as a civili-
zation, consider racial differences in making certain legal decisions; or
should we disregard them entirely as irrelevant under law? Can these
diametrically opposed policies co-exist? Will one eventually prevail?
Will they ever be reconciled? These questions are largely academic, and
need not be addressed here. The more pressing question is: Will the soci-
ety known as the United States of America, and the constituent states
that comprise it, be able to fulfill the promise that all persons are created
equal? Will the republic evolve to the point where equal protection of
law for everyone is reality, or will it forever be relegated to the dustbin of
empty political polemic? For if the republic cannot guarantee its own
citizenry equal protection under its own laws, can it survive? Should it?
Antedating the inception of the republic, the original thirteen colonies
suffered pangs of racial discord. The Constitutional Convention that con-
vened in Philadelphia, the city of "brotherly love," in the spring of 1787,
was compelled to accept the three-fifths compromise on the divisive issue
of slavery, which had pitted southern agrarian interests against the finan-
cial and mercantile interests of the north.12 As originally enacted, Article
I, Section 2 of the newly-proposed Constitution provided that members
of the House of Representatives and direct taxes would be apportioned
among the states by number of inhabitants, determined by adding all free
persons including indentured servants, "excluding Indians not taxed,"
and "three fifths of all other Persons."13 "All other persons," as any
school child learns, referred to the slaves conscripted from the continent
of Africa. 4 Ironically, it was the Southern states that lobbied to include
the slaves in the census, since slaves outnumbered free Whites in many
Southern states.' 5 Thus, including slaves in the official population would
9. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 111-13 (2002).
10. Id. at 27-29.
11. Id. at 47-52.
12. BENJAMIN GINSBURG ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION To AMERICAN
POLITICS 47-49 (4th ed. 2003).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
14. See GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 12, at 48.
15. Id. at 47-48.
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have bolstered the power of the south in the newly-created Congress.16
Since the North feared that inclusion of slaves would dilute its congres-
sional strength vis-A-vis the South, it opposed their inclusion.17 As far
back as the inception of the republic, persons of African heritage, even
though recognized as human beings, still were not free and equal beings
in the eyes of the law.
Following the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 and the Civil War
from 1861 to 1865, venue of this battle for legal equality has shifted from
battlefields to courthouses, statehouses, and executive mansions - reposi-
tories of legal jurisdiction.18 The major premise of this article is that ab-
sent discrimination, and all else being equal, one should not be selected
for vetting by law enforcement based upon their race or ethnicity. Cynics
argue that racial profiling should not be illegal, if race or ethnicity could
be considered to be a valid indicator of criminal proclivity.19 Prison
populations are inhabited by a disproportionately larger percentage of
African-Americans and Hispanics than Anglos, compared to their overall
representation in the population-at-large, and many argue that this offers
prima facie evidence that minority groups commit a greater proportion of
crime, thereby imparting relevance of race to criminality.2" The fallacy
present in such an argument is the blatant disregard for all variables other
than race. Minority groups may be incarcerated in greater proportions
than Whites because they are more likely to be vetted as a result of their
race.2" Or, perhaps due to a greater police presence in predominantly
Black and Hispanic neighborhoods, those groups are more prone to offi-
cial scrutiny.22 Alternately, other non-racial variables, like poverty or
16. Id. at 48-49.
17. Id. at 48.
18. See generally id. at 160-205.
19. For an example of this argument, see HEATHER MACDONALD, ARE Cops RA-
CIST? 28-34 (2003).
20. A recent study by the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that over the past fif-
teen years the percentage of the Whites in prison dropped from nearly sixty percent in
1984 to around thirty-five percent in 2002, while the percentage of minorities in prison has
correspondingly increased. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDE-
LINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM is ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 115 (2004), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/15-year/15year.htm.
21. One recent study of racial profiling statistics in Texas found that Blacks and His-
panics are still more likely to be the subject of consent searches. See MOLLY TOTMAN &
DWIGHT STEWARD, SEARCHING FOR CONSENT: AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL PROFILING
DATA IN TEXAS 2-3 (2006), available at http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/user
files/RPreportFINAL withCovers.pdf.
22. One possible solution to the problem of distrust of law enforcement in minority
communities that is often pushed by law enforcement officials is community policing,
which calls for greater citizen participation in policing. See Douglas Davidson, Deputy
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23cultural differences, may be entering into the equation. Whatever the
reasons, the argument ignores a myriad of variables underlying the
problem.
Does racial proclivity toward crime exist?24 Does criminal activity cut
across racial lines? Are white collar criminals more often white? Is street
crime the predominant domain of African-Americans and Hispanics?
Are those criminals who can afford better lawyers, more likely to escape
conviction than those who cannot, regardless of race? 25 Do some (or
many) of the guilty, regardless of race, escape detection, conviction, and
punishment? Do some (or many) of the innocent, regardless of race, suf-
fer wrongful conviction and punishment? Even then, the cynic could ar-
gue that no system of justice is perfect (and no humanly devised
institution is), and that some (or many) of the guilty will avoid punish-
ment, while some (or many) of the innocent will inevitably suffer, due to
inherent flaws in the system.26 The cynic will say that, in the long run, the
Chief, U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, State-
ment to the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension and Implementation Meeting (Oct.
28, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/14784.htm).
23. One newspaper article found that cultural differences between police officers and
members of Toronto's Chinese community significantly undermined that community's rela-
tionship with law enforcement. See Taneisha Davidson, Chinatown Cultural Barriers Un-
dermine Relations with Police: To Few Police Speak Chinese, Community Leader Says,
ToRoNro OBSERVER, Mar. 1, 2002, available at http://observer.thecentre.centennialcol-
lege.ca/features/chinatowncops03OlO2.htm.
24. Some groups argue the answer to this question is yes. See generally AMERICAN
RENAISSANCE, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2d ed.
2005), available at http://www.amren.com/store/colorcrime.htm.
25. Indeed, before the passage of the Texas Fair Defense Act in 2001, Texas Apple-
seed, a non-profit public policy group, conducted a study that found the indigent defense
system in Texas to be in a deplorable state. Local counties were required to set up and
fund their own indigent defense systems with little or no help from the Texas Legislature,
and with few accountability standards or procedures in place. See generally TEX. APPLE-
SEED FAIR DEF. PROJECT, THE FAIR DEFENSE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
PRACTICES IN TEXAS (2000), available at http://www.equaljusticecenter.org/Fair%20De-
fense%20Reference%20Report.pdf.
26. While the debate over whether our criminal justice system has a propensity to
convict the innocent and set the guilty free takes place in nearly all segments of the crimi-
nal justice system, it is particularly heated in several fields. Among these are the fields of
DNA testing, capital punishment, and indigent defense. For an overview of the debate in
these fields please consult the following sources: AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDENTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTIN-
UING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf; RICHARD C. DEITER, DEATH PENALTY
NFo. CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY (2004), avail-
able at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=1149; Maurice Posley et
al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across
U.S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at CL.
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system is fair because it provides the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber of people.27
But, if that is true, then what type of society promotes such ideals? An
efficient one, perhaps, but certainly not a just one. Any society that toler-
ates, much less condones, donning blinders to guilt while staring ac-
cusatorily at the innocent, based upon the distinction between weak and
strong, cannot be considered to be just in an enlightened system of law.
It is not, and should not be, the United States of America of the twenty-
first century. No longer is this the era of Dred Scott.28 The law has
evolved from less enlightened antebellum days.
As a response to the tendency to analyze crime in the context of race,
Glen C. Loury, in his trenchant opus, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality,
argues:
Recall Axiom 2, which constrains this theoretical project by a base-
line presumption that I have called "anti-essentialism." Explaining
protracted and durable racial inequality becomes relatively easy if
one admits the possibility of inherent racial differences in human at-
tributes that significantly influence the ability of individuals to act
effectively (intelligence, for example). I reject this possibility ....
[I]n a raced polity committed to democratic values, a public dis-
course that imputes inherent incapacity to some raced group of citi-
zens is fundamentally inconsistent with the espoused democratic
ideals.29
Notwithstanding anything else, imputation of inferiority to any race
due to congenital characteristics is simply inconsistent with firmly-stated
constitutional precepts. 30 It is not only legally unsustainable, and politi-
cally unpalatable, but also morally reprehensible. If one accepts the ulti-
macy of the promise contained in the founding charter of the republic as
27. Indeed, some argue that the number of people who have been exonerated follow-
ing a death sentence is so miniscule that changes in the various death penalty systems
across the country are really not necessary, and that adequate safeguards for protecting the
innocent are already in place. See DUDLEY SHARP, JUSTICE FOR ALL, DEATH PENALTY
AND SENTENCING INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1997), http://www.prodeathpen-
alty.com/DP.html#A.Innocence.
28. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that Blacks could not become
citizens).
29. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 91.
30. Even as it upheld the University of Michigan Law School's policy which took race
into account during admissions, the United States Supreme Court was careful to state that
laws and policies motivated by a belief in racial inferiority were by definition "illegiti-
mate." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
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well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, then it is easy to
recognize the allegation of racial inferiority as the point of origination."
Given that racial "essentialism" is antithetical to American constitu-
tional ideals, it stands to reason that minority races should not bear a
greater burden of being searched by law enforcement officers than their
white counterparts.32 One would expect to find that, absent discrimina-
tion, racial minorities are searched at rates less than or equal to Whites.
However, this is not the case.33
The question is not so much whether such disparities exist; the data
indicate that they do.34 More perspicacious questions are: Why do they
exist, and continue to persist? What can be done to eliminate them? Af-
ter exploring what the data indicate, this article will demonstrate ways to
present a prima facie case of racial profiling in the courtroom. I will then
suggest incremental measures to alleviate these racial disparities, with an
eye on the ultimate goal of their elimination, for the consideration of the
duly-elected and appointed policymakers.
II. WHAT IS RACIAL PROFILING?
But I know it when I see it.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring)
In the first quarter of 2003, The Dallas Morning News reported that
racial disparities in criminal searches contumaciously persisted.35
"Search ratios" based upon race did "not vary significantly" from the pre-
vious year for the City of Dallas.36 Blacks were over twice as likely to be
searched as Whites, and Hispanics over three times as likely.37
Although rarely reported, the debate over racial profiling really re-
volves around two main issues: (1) exactly what is it? and (2) why does it
persist? Addressing the first issue is a dearth of any universal agreement
on a definition of "racial profiling." According to one author . . . "racial
31. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
32. Racial essentialism is an academic theory which claims that the biological traits
which form the basis of racial membership, also tend to determine certain internal traits,
such as intelligence. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 5-6; Naomi Zack, Philosophical Aspects
of the 'AAA Statement on Race', 1 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 445, 445 (2001).
33. See TOTMAN & STEWARD, supra note 21, at 2-3.
34. Id.
35. Michael Grabell, Racial Disparities in Searches Persist. Dallas Traffic Stop Data
Similar to Year Before; Doubts Dog Numbers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 2, 2004, at
B1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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profiling'. . . has only recently appeared and has no set meaning. '38 An-
other obstacle is defining a benchmark against which to judge racial dis-
parities.39 Grogger and Ridgeway4" opine that creating such a standard is
a "key empirical problem."'"
The federally-funded COPS report has adopted the following defini-
tion from the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Execu-
tives (NOBLE): "The act (intentional or unintentional) of applying or
incorporating personal, societal or organizational biases and/or stereo-
types in decision-making, police actions or the administration of
justice."42
Schauer43 maintains that racial profiling is the result of public officials
using their own judgment in determining who and who not to vet, based
upon criteria they alone deem to be just cause for suspicion.' This no-
tion of racial profiling harmonizes with Justice Thurgood Marshall's dis-
senting admonition in United States v. Sokolow,4 5 warning against the
absence of a "mechanistic application of a formula," in favor of an "of-
ficer's ability and determination to make sensitive and fact-specific infer-
ences 'in light of his experience."' 46 Nevertheless, it might be argued that
a better definition of racial profiling, as Schauer goes on to elaborate,
includes more than race "on a formal list of suspicion - raising factors,"
and takes into account "racial animus" or the "mistaken belief" that race
is a valid indicator of guilt.47
Even ardent proponents of using race as a proclivity of suspicion, like
Heather Mac Donald,48 distinguish between "hard" and "soft" profiling,
the former using race as the sole criterion for criminal prediction, the
38. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 654 (2002) (citing Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Jerome Skolnick &
Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs, and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial
profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 419 n.36 (2001)).
39. Jefferey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops
From Behind a Veil of Darkness 1 (Harris Sch., Working Paper No. 05.7, 2005), available at
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/About/publications/working-papers/pdf/wpO05_07.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. JOYCE MCMAHON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED
POLICING SERVS., HOW TO CORRECTLY COLLECT AND ANALYZE RACIAL PROFILING
DATA: YOUR REPUTATION DEPENDS ON IT 21 (2002) [hereinafter COPS REPORT].
43. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILMIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003).
44. Id. at 173.
45. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 13.
47. See SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 180.
48. MACDONALD, supra note 19.
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latter using it as one of several criteria.49 Nobel Laureates Gary Becker5"
and Kenneth Arrow51 attempted to define prejudicial profiling as the
conscious decision to relinquish some profits for the sake of maximizing
utility of racial prejudice, which is a rational decision if preference is
given to forego some monetary profits to satiate one's prejudicial appe-
tite.52 Firms employing such profit-compromising motives, Becker and
Arrow argued, would eventually be forced out of business, due to eco-
nomic inefficiency.53 Still, this definition fails to address the question of
just what is racial profiling.
Although pundits disagree on a definition of racial profiling, whether
intentional, "aversive," 54 or subconscious, the common denominator ap-
pears to incorporate racial or ethnic characteristics in any deliberative
choice or decision.55 And, although racial profiling exhibits myriad
forms, the literature focuses on three often overlapping areas - economic,
educational, and legal.56 Much more literature exists on racial discrimi-
nation than on the specific topic of "racial profiling," but, for obvious
reasons the two are inextricably intertwined. What follows here is a brief
overview of both subjects in the fields of education, employment, and
economics.
In education, racial discrimination traditionally has appeared as school
segregation, integration, and affirmative action.57 San Miguel and Valen-
cia58 explored the struggle of Hispanics from segregation through Hop-
wood5 9 to attain educational parity in the southwestern United States. In
49. Id. at 10.
50. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
51. Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
52. See BECKER, supra note 50, at 16; see also id. at 3.
53. See id. at 16.
54. John F. Dovido & Samuel L. Gaertner, Affirmative Action, Unintentional Racial
Biases, and Intergroup Relations, 52 J. SOC. ISSUES 51, 54 (1996).
55. See SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 173; see also id. at 54.
56. These three types of racial profiling will be discussed in greater detail below, but
for an overview please consult the following sources, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971); Ann-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003); Charles T.
Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan Areas (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper no. 6779, 1998), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6779.
57. For an informative overview of how these aspects of racial profiling have effected
Mexican-Americans in the American Southwest, see Guadalupe San Miguel, Jr. & Richard
R. Valencia, From the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to Hopwood: the Educational Plight
and Struggle of Mexican Americans in the Southwest, 68 HARV. EDUC. REv. 353, 368-77,
390-95 (1998).
58. See generally id.
59. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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addition, Clotfelter6' examined racial discrimination as a function of pub-
lic school enrollment and segregation within, and among, school districts
in the metropolitan United States. 61 Finally, when examining patterns of
South African racial inclusion and exclusion analogous to patterns in the
United States, King62 wondered whether "comprehensive racial inclu-
sion" in American schools was an "elusive goal.",63
In economics, racial profiling assumes innumerable guises. 64 For exam-
ple, in the fields of insurance, banking, financing, and housing, it has been
called "redlining" and "rationing., 65 It may be found in virtually every
aspect of employment - hiring, discipline, compensation, promotion, de-
motion and termination.66 Even in the prosaic world of retail sales, racial
profiling may manifest itself whenever a clerk, consciously or subcon-
sciously, considers it worth the time and effort to assist a customer be-
cause of the clerk's stereotypical preconceptions of whether that
customer can afford a good or service, based upon the customer's race.67
60. Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan Areas (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6779, 1998), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w6779.
61. Id. at 5-6.
62. Kimberly L. King, Is Comprehensive Racial Inclusion an Illusive Goal for Educa-
tional Institutions in the United States?, 34 EouITY & EXCELLENCE EDuc. 43 (2001).
63. Id. at 43.
64. The guises that racial profiling take in economics is discussed in more detail be-
low. For a thorough overview of the subject please consult the following sources generally,
STEPHEN Ross & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION,
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT (2002); TOM BAKER &
KAREN MCELRATH, INSURANCE CLAIMS DISCRIMINATION, INSURANCE REDLINING: DISIN-
VESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 141-56
(1997); ANTHONY M. YEZER, FAIR LENDING ANALYSIS: A COMPENDIUM OF ESSAYS ON
THE USE OF STATISTICS (1995); Scott E. Harrington & Greg Neihaus, Race, Redlining, and
Automobile Insurance Prices, 71 J. Bus. 439 (1998); see also Harris, supra note 56, at 8;
Robert W. Klein & Martin F. Grace, Urban Homeowners Insurance Markets in Texas: A
Search for Redlining, 68 J. RISK & INS. 581 (2001); Harry L. Margulis, Predicting the
Growth and Filtering of At-risk Housing: Structure Ageing, Poverty and Redlining, 35 URB.
STUD. 1231 (1998); Frank E. Nothaft & Vanessa G. Perry, Do Mortgage Rates Vary by
Neighborhood? Implications for Loan Pricing & Redlining, 11 J. HOUSING ECON. 244, 262
(2002).
65. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 39; Michael S. Bar, Modes of Credit Market
Regulation 4 (John M. Olin Ctr. For Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 45, 2005),
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=UMichlwps.
66. Racial Discrimination in the Workplace, http://www.discriminationattorney.coml
race.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
67. Harris, supra note 56, at 8.
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In the banking, credit, insurance, and housing fields, literature related
to race abounds.68 The process that occurs when a company considers
whether to grant or underwrite loans or insurance policies in so-called
undesirable neighborhoods, based upon racial demographics, is known as
"redlining." '69 In extreme cases, people who fall on the wrong side of the
line receive neither goods nor services, or pay an inflated premium due to
stereotyped risk imbued in the underwriting process. 71 When they ex-
amined disparities in mortgage lending from a nationally representative
sample of neighborhoods in data blocked by racial composition, Nothaft
and Perry71 were unable to confirm the existence of redlining.72 Margu-
lis73 tried to determine whether redlining in Cleveland existed and per-
formed a regression analysis by studying housing conditions and
probability of obtaining a mortgage, as a function of race, poverty, and
structure age.7 1 Yezer 75 assembled a "compendium" of statistical studies
on race as affecting mortgage lending and neighborhood redlining. 6
Burgeoning literature exists on racial discrimination in the insurance in-
dustry, an area that, in and of itself, promises to generate fertile ground
for debate, legislation and litigation far into the foreseeable future.7 7
Ross and Yinger 78 have written what is arguably the definitive work on
racial discrimination in the mortgage lending business. After examining
the Boston Fed Study, they take pains to rebut critics of the study before
proposing their own methodologies for addressing racial discrimination in
mortgage underwriting and credit scoring.79 According to Ross and
Yinger, the overriding difficulty of any study of racial discrimination is
the distinction between so-called disparate treatment and disparate im-
68. For only a few examples, see Ross & YINGER, supra note 64; Margulis, supra note
64; Harrington & Neihaus, supra note 64 (discussing automobile insurance premiums in
Missouri as a function of race).
69. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 39.
70. Id.; see also Harrington & Neihaus, supra note 64, at 443 (discussing automobile
insurance premiums in Missouri as a function of race).
71. Nothaft & Perry, supra note 64.
72. Id. at 262.
73. Margulis, supra note 64.
74. Id. at 1232.
75. Anthony M. Yezer, Fair Lending Analysis: A Compendium of Essays on the Use of
Statistics, American Bankers Ass'n (1995), noted in DOUGLAS D. EVANOFF & LEWIS M.
SEGAL, CRA AND FAIR LENDING REGULATIONS: RESULTING TRENDS IN MORTGAGE
LENDING 38 n.10 (1996).
76. Id.
77. Harrington & Neihaus, supra note 64; see also Klein & Grace, supra note 64
(econometric study of statistical significance in setting insurance premiums for Texas urban
homeowners).
78. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64.
79. Id. at 3-8, 10-14.
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pact analysis."0 The former is characterized by intentionally treating peo-
ple differently on the basis of some legally-protected status.81 The latter
involves actions which produce disparate effects on similarly-situated
people, based upon some legally-protected status, even if those actions
exhibit facial benignity.82 Because of the ostensible benignity, it is always
more difficult to investigate disparate impact than disparate treatment.
83
Although Ross and Yinger developed methodologies for detecting the
existence of both forms of discrimination, their work focused on disparate
impact.84 In the legal context, the distinction between the two forms of
discrimination traces back to Griggs v. Duke Power Co." Griggs opined
that certain practices, while superficially benign, may be infused with dis-
criminatory effect.86 "The Act [Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights] pros-
cribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation."" Ross and Yinger also acknowl-
edged the phenomenon of statistical discrimination, which they described
as a form of disparate impact. 8 Credit criteria applied equally is not dis-
criminatory, notwithstanding profitability or lack of it.8 9 Different crite-
ria applied to minorities (a "protected class" to use legal argot) is
discriminatory whether profitable or not.90 "The law does not allow a
lender to use different criteria for people in a protected class than for
other people even if it is more profitable to do so." 91
In credit discrimination cases, courts likewise distinguish between dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact.92 Disparate treatment can be
proven by demonstrating that a lender either overtly applied legally-pro-
hibited criteria, or was unable to explain adequately its use of discrimina-
tory criteria with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. 3  Under
disparate impact analysis, unless facially-benign practices can be corrobo-
80. Id. at 274-76.
81. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971); see also id. at 432.
82. Id. at 431; see also Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 32.
83. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 313, 361.
84. Id. at 361-68.
85. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
86. Id. at 431.
87. Id.
88. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 41.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 32 (quoting OFFICE OF TrliE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL.,
INTERAGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES ii, iv (1999)).
93. Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 32 (quoting OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, ET AL., INTERAGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES ii, iv
(1999)).
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rated by justifiable, nondiscriminatory necessity, the so-called "business
necessity" doctrine, such practices may be indicia of prohibited
discrimination.94
Similarly, the decision of a law enforcement officer to stop or search a
suspect is hardly an objective matter.95 Inherently, it is subjective.9 6
True, there are racially benign indicia that may, and probably do, trigger a
decision to stop or search, like certain distinctive odors, facial expressions
(bloodshot eyes or dilated pupils), and contraband in plain view. How-
ever, officers often testify that their decision to stop, and especially, to
search, a suspect is precipitated by an intangible viscera.97 Thus, in many
cases, the final determination is subjective, even if not purely so.
In legal fora, it is the distinction between objective and subjective that
trumps all other issues in cases of racial discrimination.9 Traditionally,
courts have applied a disparate treatment standard of proof to subjective
practices, perhaps because disparate treatment is "the most easily under-
stood type of discrimination."99 Disparate treatment, simply put, re-
quires proof, to some degree, of the intent which motivates the action in
question.100 Because racial profiling is a subjective, rather than objective
phenomenon, proof of intent is problematic in the judicial context.101
94. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTER-
AGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES ii, iv (1999)).
95. Even the United States Supreme Court has stated that the decision to conduct a
search should be left to the discretion of a police officer. See United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
96. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that all searches and seizures
must be based upon reasonableness, and "[w]hat is reasonable depends upon all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure
itself." See id. at 537. This implies that the decision of whether or not to conduct a search
is entirely a matter of officer discretion based upon the information he has available to him
at the time. This seems highly subjective.
97. These particular incendiary are accepted by courts. See United States v. MacKey,
149 Fed. Apx. 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Rhodes, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18701 (10th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Cook, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1168 (D. Colo. 1998). However, courts have held that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits stops and searches based solely on the "whim" of an
officer. See United States v. Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 937 (8th Cir. 2004).
98. It was this issue that initially led the Supreme Court to craft the disparate impact
standard. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
99. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1997).
100. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 32 (quoting OFFICE OF THE COMPTROL-
LER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES
ii, iv (1999)).
101. In the legal world, racial profiling generally surfaces in the form of "selective
enforcement claims." These claims always require a criminal defendant to prove not only
that the traffic stop had a discriminatory effect, but also that it was prompted by a discrimi-
natory intent. See United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Sterling,
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Lundman and Kaufman 10 2 point to deficiencies in the study of racial
profiling in criminal law: restriction of most studies to particularized juris-
dictions, reliance upon law enforcement officials as the exclusive data col-
lectors, and use of single variable regression analysis.1 °3 Early studies on
racial profiling in criminal law were conducted by the American Civil
Liberties Union. 0 n Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Na-
tion's Highways' °5 was a nascent effort to examine the issue. Notwith-
standing its claim that "[t]he data are irrefutable," the study was
comprised largely of rather unreliable narratives of lawsuits filed by the
ACLU against various jurisdictions.106 Although there was some rudi-
mentary reliance on quantitative data, the study was primarily anecdo-
tal. 10 7 However, it should be noted that in 1999, data collection on racial
profiling was in its infancy; the report recommended that the fifty largest
cities in the United States should "voluntarily collect traffic stop data." ' 8
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence109 was an
early quantitative effort. It implicitly condemned, yet attempted to com-
pensate for, previously-used research indicating "that the proportion of
African-Americans among the drivers searched by police far exceeds the
proportion in the general population of drivers."'11 It proposed a mathe-
matical model for isolating an underlying variable for racial profiling, and
drew the distinction between "statistical discrimination," and ordinary ra-
cial prejudice (animus). l aa Statistical profiling occurs when an officer re-
lies upon race as one factor, among others, to maximize, in his or her own
mind, successful search criteria, wherein race can be a valid predictor of
110 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ariz. 2005); People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2004); United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160-61 (D. Kan.
2004); United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 963 (D. Neb. 2004).
102. Richard J. Lundman & Robert L. Kaufman, Driving While Black: Effects of
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on Citizen Self-Reports of Traffic Stops and Police Actions, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 195 (2003).
103. Id. at 198-99.
104. See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE
BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS (1999), available at http://www.
aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 27-35.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 39, 41.
109. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001).
110. Id. at 204.
111. Id. at 209-10.
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criminality.' 12 Ordinary racial prejudice, by contrast, occurs when an of-
ficer simply exhibits a taste for harassing members of a particular race.' 13
To detect racial profiling, Knowles, Persico, and Todd relied upon a
dataset collected by the Maryland State Police, which was compelled to
supply such information by court order, as a result of a lawsuit filed by
the ACLU. 114 The data consisted of 1,590 recorded vehicle searches on
Interstate Highway 95 in Maryland from January 1995 to January 1999.11'
Variables included the driver's race and sex, vehicle model, make, year,
time, date, and location of search, in addition to whether probable cause
existed or the search was consensual, whether drug sniffing dogs were
deployed, whether drugs were discovered, and if so, type and quantity, as
well as the name, but not race, of the officer conducting the search.116
The dependent variable (effect variable) was "search," but not stops.11 7
The null hypothesis (a statement of the status quo, or at least the way
things should be) was that "the guilty rate should be the same across [ra-
cial] groups."'1 8 In other words, the premise for their study was that ra-
cial profiling did not exist. The authors found that vehicles operated by
African-Americans were searched more frequently than those of Whites,
but that conviction rates for both races were similar; and that probability
of a successful search (finding contraband) varying by race was not statis-
tically significant.11 9 Thus, hit rates (finding contraband) and convictions
were about equal for Blacks and Whites, but Blacks were searched more
often, implying that race was a factor in the decision to search. 120
Theoretically, according to Knowles, Persico, and Todd, the transaction
costs of conducting searches, based solely upon race, should, on average,
be higher and therefore less productive than searching without regard to
race.12' This is because transaction costs, such as inability to search
others concurrently with the racially-motivated search, unsuccessful
searches and unfruitful testimony in court, should exceed any benefit de-
rived as a result of discriminating by race, thereby discouraging such ac-
tivity in the long run.'2 2 Ultimately, although disparities in searches
based upon race were found to have existed, the authors failed to reject
112. Id. at 210.
113. Id.
114. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 109, at 215.
115. Id. at 216.
116. Id.
117, Id.
118. Id. at 217.
119. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 219-22 (2001).
120. Id. at 219.
121. Id. at 206.
122. Id. at 204-05.
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their null hypothesis of no racial profiling.'23 Any inequality in the
"search" dependent variable was due to "statistical discrimination," not
"racial prejudice" or taste-based discrimination.124 The authors con-
cluded that no racial prejudice existed against African-Americans in vehi-
cle searches from the Maryland data; although lower conviction rates for
Hispanics were "suggestive of prejudice against [them].' 25
Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data126
was a sequel drawing upon the methodology of Knowles, Persico, and
Todd.' 2 7 It relied upon an aggregated dataset of traffic stops and
searches from August 28 (the effective date of the data collection law) to
December 31, 2000 by over ninety-one percent of Missouri law enforce-
ment agencies. 128 An attempt was made to isolate "statistical" discrimi-
nation from prejudicial ("taste-based") discrimination for three Missouri
law enforcement agencies. 29 Statistical discrimination, posited the au-
thors, may be efficient law enforcement because it has the potential to
increase successful searches by assisting in identifying suspects; but pure
prejudice would be inefficient, due to increased likelihood of unneces-
sary, unsuccessful searches conducted merely for harassment.'
30
Similar to the null hypothesis of Knowles, Persico, and Todd of equality
across racial lines for returns to searches, the authors hypothesized that
search success rates should be "equal across all observable groups. '
Extending the analysis, the authors assumed that while motorists differ in
their propensity to carry contraband, high risk motorists should be in-
clined to minimize their risk by refraining from carrying contraband. 32
Assuming existence of prejudice, the authors inferred that police would
continue to search the group with the minimized risk, thereby resulting in
a lower success rate for that group.1 3 3 Such a finding could be inferential
of racial profiling. 1 34 Applying an econometric model to the dataset to
test for marginal changes in probability of successful search rates by race
for the three Missouri agencies, the authors concluded that African-
Americans and Hispanics were victims of "taste-based" discrimination, or
123. Id. at 219-22.
124. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 109, at 205.
125. Id. at 228.
126. Ruben Hernandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?:
Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 Ir, r'L ECON. REV. 959 (2004).
127. Id. at 960.
128. Id. at 967.
129. Id. at 965.
130. Id.
131. Hernandez-Murillo & Knowles, supra note 126, at 960.
132. Id. at 985.
133. Id. at 960-61.
134. Id. at 960.
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plain prejudice. 135 Although these groups bore a marginally greater
probability of being searched, success of finding contraband during such
searches was lower than for Whites.' 36
Critical of data collection conducted by the law enforcement officials
themselves, Lundman and Kaufman 13 7 relied upon self-reporting by citi-
zens, specifically a 1999 national sample conducted by the National Crime
Victimization Survey.138 Referred to as Contacts between Police and the
Public: Findings from the 1999 National Survey, subjects at least sixteen
years old were asked a series of questions about whether they had been
victimized by crime and had encountered police contact during the previ-
ous twelve months.139 Only subjects who reported "at least one traffic
stop in which they were the driver" (7034 observations) were selected for
the study.140 The authors were trying to isolate socio-economic variables
that were used as a pretext for discrimination.' 4 1 Variables not the kind
typically reported by law enforcement (odors emanating from the vehicle,
conflicting stories among vehicle occupants, items in plain view, vehicle
alterations, and so forth) were reported by the citizens. 142 Relevant inde-
pendent (cause) variables included jurisdiction population size, social
class and age of respondent, gender, race/ethnicity, and the respondent's
"perception of the legitimacy of the stop," as well as "whether [the] po-
lice acted properly.' ' 143 Three dependent (effect) variables144 were ex-
amined: "total traffic stops," "legitimate reason for stop," and "police
acted properly. 1 45 In all models, the authors found that men generally,
and African-American men specifically, were more prone to being
stopped than either Whites or women. 1 46 African-Americans and His-
panics were more prone to deny the legitimacy of the stop, which the
authors perceived to be problematic due to the resulting erosion of citi-
zen confidence in law enforcement. 1
47
135. Id. at 965.
136. Ruben Hernandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?:
Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 959, 984-86 (2004).
137. Lundman & Kaufman, supra note 102.
138. Id. at 199.
139. Id. at 199-200.
140. Id. at 199.
141. Id. at 195-96.
142. Lundman & Kaufman, supra note 102, at 201-04.
143. ld. at 201-04, 206-07.
144. In econometrics, a dependent variable is the effect; independent variables are
explanatory. See DAMADOR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRics 21-22 (3d ed. 1995).
145. Lundman & Kaufman, supra note 102, at 200.
146. Id. at 204-06.
147. Id. at 206, 210.
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Use of "triangulated data," as proposed by the authors, was one solu-
tion to the perception of biased data collection by law enforcement. 4
8
As a three-dimensional check, the authors also promoted sending along
third party observers to record not just the demeanor of officers and citi-
zens, but also "to observe and record the race and ethnicity of the many
traffic violators who police witness but choose to leave alone."'4 9 Use of
"triangulated data," however, seems impractical. First, if the third-party
observer is supposed to be neutral, how would he or she be selected - by
a committee of law enforcement and citizens or from a panel, perhaps,
like an arbitrator? Second and more fundamental, how could anyone ac-
curately report what someone else may or may not have observed but
chose to ignore? Inevitably, this would necessitate delving into the mind
of the subject of the observation. Instead of consciously ignoring a White
violator, it is possible that the officer simply became distracted, looked
away and missed something. Bias on the part of the observer is unavoid-
able. The "observed but left alone" variable permits too much discretion,
on the part of the officer and the third-party observer alike, to make this
variable useful or practical.
Ideological opponents in the racial profiling debate are David A. Har-
ris and Heather Mac Donald. 5 ' In Profiles in Injustice, 5 ' Harris estab-
lishes himself as the chief proponent of the anti-profiling faction; whereas
in Are Cops Racist?,1"2 Mac Donald is a stalwart advocate of including
race as a law enforcement variable in the post-September 11, 2001 era.
Both of their works are more anecdotal than quantitative; and although
both authors cite statistics in support of their respective hypotheses, they
rely upon secondary data. 153 What is troubling about the anti-profiling
faction is, in MacDonald's opinion, the lack of a statistical benchmark
against which to compare stop and search rates of minorities.154 If police
are searching or arresting more minorities than their proportional repre-
sentation in the population, it must be because minorities are committing
a disproportionately larger share of crime, she opines.' 55 Good police
are, in Mac Donald's opinion, color blind, as they see only good guys and
bad guys; even though Mac Donald manages to concede the existence of
rogue cops who harbor a proclivity for racial prejudice. Mac Donald ad-
148. Id. at 214.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. MACDONALD, supra note 19; DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY
RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002).
151. See HARRIS, supra note 150.
152. See MACDONALD, supra note 19.
153. See, e.g., id. at 28-34; HARRIS, supra note 150, at 13-14, 79-84.
154. See MACDONALD, supra note 19, at 15.
155. Id.
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vocates sweeping stops and frisks on streets as a legitimate means for
uncovering illegal weapons, as well as singling out Middle Easterners as
suspected terrorists.'56 MacDonald argues that under the rubric of na-
tional security, law enforcement is justified in employing almost any
available stop, search, and seizure tactic. Hard profiling - using race as
the only factor in identifying criminal activity - she condemns; but soft
profiling - using race as one factor out of several for suspicion of crimi-
nality - she condones.' 57
Opposite Mac Donald, the standard bearer for the anti-profiling fac-
tion, is David A. Harris, whose book, Profiles in Injustice, Why Racial
Profiling Cannot Work, is the antithesis of Mac Donald's Are Cops Ra-
cist? In Chapter One, a compilation of racial profiling horror stories, in-
cluding one about Texas Federal District Judge Filemon Vela, Harris
hypothesizes that the somewhat benign use of "criminal profiling" has
evolved into racial profiling.158 Not only is racial profiling unethical, im-
moral, and unconstitutional, argues Harris, it is not even prudent polic-
ing, in that it yields less than optimum "hit rates," or probability of
finding contraband.' 59 Harris lays blame not at the feet of rogue cops
who have a taste for discrimination, but at the institutions that produce
and nurture them. 6 ° In that sense, Harris is seeking, and is convinced he
has found, evidence of a disparate impact of criminal profiling against
minorities at the institutional level, thus transforming what began as crim-
inal profiling into outright discrimination.' 6 ' This transformation traces
its origins to a set of observable criminal characteristics compiled in the
1980s by Volusia County, Florida Sheriff Bob Vogel to interdict drug
dealers.' 62 Eventually, it grew into full-blown racial profiling following
adoption and modification of Vogel's techniques by the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) under the rubric of "Opera-
tion Pipeline."' 63 As a federal law enforcement agency, the DEA wields
tremendous influence upon the war on drugs, from the national level
down to the most pedestrian municipality.' 64 Harris condemns the DEA
156. Id. at 155.
157. Id. at 15-16.
158. See HARRIS, supra note 150, at 130-31, 48-72.
159. Id. at 79-84.
160. Indeed, Harris goes a step further and offers solutions that police departments
can implement to reduce racial profiling among their officers. See id. at 145-207.
161. Id. at 72.
162. Id. at 48.
163. See HARRIS, supra note 150, at 48-49.
164. The DEA describes its Office of Training as "the preeminent law enforcement
training organization," and they offer training to all law enforcement agencies involved in
drug trafficking prevention operations. See DEA Training Programs, Mission, http://www.
dea.gov/programs/training/partl.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
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training emulated by law enforcement agencies worldwide as injecting in-
stitutional racial prejudice into algorithms for predicting criminality.165
As an example, he cites to a 1999 DEA report that indicates certain char-
acteristics and factors that officers should look for in spotting heroin deal-
ers.166 "Predominant wholesale traffickers are Columbian, followed by
Dominicans, Chinese, West African/Nigerian, Pakistani, Hispanic, and In-
dian. Midlevels are dominated by Dominicans, Columbians, Puerto Ri-
cans, African Americans, and Nigerians.' 167 From such origins, the
hydra of racial profiling has sprung many heads.1 68 Harris continues by
describing the most egregious cases of racial profiling, now well-known
and oft-cited, in New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, Illinois, and
elsewhere. 16
9
The Wichita Stop Study 170 utilized a dataset of 37,454 traffic stops by
the Wichita, Kansas Police Department.17 A statistical model was devel-
oped to predict marginal propensity for being searched.172 Included in
the equation were officer-related criteria, citizen race or ethnicity, arrest
or search resulting from the stop, location, driver age, and other vari-
ables. 173 Based upon this model, the author concluded that in Wichita
during the period in question, both race and ethnicity played roles in
search probability, and that African-Americans and Hispanics were more
prone to being searched than non-Blacks and non-Hispanics. 174
In a study prepared at the behest of the Texas Branch of the NAACP,
A Statistical Examination of Racial Profiling,175 Steward and Berg ex-
amined search rates between minority and White Texas motorists.' 76 Two
caveats are noteworthy. First, since this study was prepared expressly for
an advocacy coalition, it suffers from at least the appearance of bias. Sec-
ond, as the authors cautioned their client, "these results are preliminary,"
especially in light of the fact that the data were collected in the very "first
165. See HARRIS, supra note 150, at 49.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues That the U.S. Wrote the
Book on Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Al).
168. Id. at 53-69.
169. Other jurisdictions in which Harris tracks the spread of racial profiling include
Colorado, Ohio, and Michigan. See id.
170. BRIAN L. WITHROW, THE WICHITA STOP STUDY (2002).
171. Id. at 11-12.
172. Id. at 38.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 39.
175. DWIGHT STEWARD & M. DOUGLAS BERG, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RACIAL
PROFILING: A PRELIMINARY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SEARCH RATES OF MINORITY
AND NON-MINORITY TEXAS MOTORISTS (2000).
176. Id. at 6-7.
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round" in Texas in March, 2000.177 The dataset consisted of approxi-
mately 65,000 stops, of which approximately two percent resulted in
searches. 178 Thus, the sample size was so minute that, at a minimum, the
study is subject to the objection that it was non-representative of the pop-
ulation of Texas motorists. Yet, even with the reservation about the non-
representative dataset, the authors concluded that actual observation of
African-Americans and Hispanics being searched was approximately two
to two-and-a-half times, respectively, more than anticipated. 179
The FBI has not been remiss in addressing racial profiling. In an article
published in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, urging law enforcement
to assuage a "skeptical public," Carrick 8 ° recommended that police
forces change the way they write citations and interview forms to include
reason for stopping, race, sex, age, and ethnicity of the suspect, type of
search, if any, reason for the search, type of contraband, if any, found,
and action taken (e.g., ticket, warning, arrest).' 8 '
Schott 182 recognized the ostensible dichotomy between "legitimate"
and "unlawful" use of racial profiling, evocative of Herndndez's and
Knowles's, and Ross and Yinger's studies of differences between statisti-
cal discrimination and racial prejudice. 183 Like Mac Donald, Schott
viewed the issue myopically. Racial profiling, he argued, "refers to action
taken by law enforcement officers solely because of an individual's race"
as distinguished from one of numerous factors entering into a decision by
law enforcement. 184
A more trenchant, albeit abbreviated, analysis in the FBI Law Enforce-
ment Bulletin was done by Kruger, an Assistant Attorney General for the
state of Maryland. 185 Acknowledging the necessity of reasonable suspi-
cion for stopping a suspect, and the unconstitutionality of detaining any-
one on the basis of race, Kruger recognized "[t]here is no one list of
177. Id. at 3, 7.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id.
180. Grady Carrick, Professional Police Traffic Stops: Strategies to Address Racial Pro-
filing, 69 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
leb/2000/nov00leb/pdf (citing Traffic Stop Statistics Act of 1999, S. Res. 821, 106th Cong.
(1999)).
181. Id. at 9.
182. Richard G. Schott, The Role of Race in Law Enforcement. Racial Profiling or
Legitimate Use?, 70 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (2001), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
publications/leb/2001/nov01eb.pdf..
183. Id. at 24-25; see also Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 41.
184. Schott, supra note 182, at 25.
185. Karen J. Kruger, Collecting Statistics in Response to Racial Profiling Allegations,
71 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 8, 8 (2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
leb/2002/may2002/may02.pdf.
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factors that gives rise to reasonable suspicion .. . . [R]easonable suspi-
cion may not be based on race alone., 186 Racial profiling, she advocates,
is a "zero tolerance" issue for law enforcement.1 87 "Officers who do not
respond to training and discipline or appear simply immoral have no
place in law enforcement."' 88 Admonitions aside, the author proposed a
more scientific methodology than did earlier works in the FBI Law En-
forcement Bulletin. 89 The author suggests that tests should include mea-
sures to account for "other behavioral variables" which may reflect
cultural or geographical bias, as well as for instance, demographic
benchmarks, and the transient nature of interstate highways.' 90
Anecdotal narratives of racial profiling proliferate the news media.
Dallas Morning News articles have been forthcoming at a constant and
increasingly frenetic pace. 19' Between September and December of
186. Id. at 8 (quoting Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops
and Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Re-
sponses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REv. 725, 729 (2000)).
187. Id. at 9.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 9-10.
190. Kruger, supra note 185, at 10.
191. See, e.g., Richard Abshire, Forum Addresses Race, Traffic Stops; Group City
Leaders Have 'Good Discussion' but No Answers Yet, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16,
2003, at Q1; Richard Abshire, Race Gaps in Search, Arrest Rates Seen; Numbers Higher for
Hispanic, Black Drivers; Chief Denies Profiling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 2003, at
Qi; Cherie Bell, Report: Blacks Pulled Over at Higher Rate: Group Only One in City
Whose Stops Exceed Driver Representation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 13, 2003, at T1;
Herb Booth, Traffic Data Show Race Gap; Police Say Several Variables Make Comparisons
Difficult, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 2003, at Ml; Debra Dennis, Police Find No
Traffic-Stop Bias; Departments Say They Are Meeting State Racial-Profiling Laws, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 7, 2003, at Ni; Tanya Eiserer, Blacks, Hispanics Subjected to More
Traffic-Stop Searches; Dallas Chief Says Time is Needed to Interpret Report Required by
Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003, at Al; Tanya Eiserer, Man Suggests Race
Played Role In Stop; Hit-Run Suspects Were White; Black Pedestrian Was Held, Then Re-
leased, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 12, 2003, at 1B; Jennifer Emily, Hispanics Searched
More Often; Police Say It's Too Early to Draw Conclusions on Traffic Stop Data, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 6, 2003, at P1; Katie Fairbank, Profiling Needed at Airports, Cran-
dall says; American's Ex-Chief Describes it as a Positive Way to Improve Security, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 21, 2002, at Dl; Michael Grabel, Racial Disparities in Searches Per-
sist: Dallas Traffic Stop Data Similar to Year Before, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 2,
2004, at Bi; Kevin Krause, Racial Gap Seen in Traffic Searches; Official Says 2002 Figures
Were Too Small to be Significant, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 12, 2003, at Ml; Eric
Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: Law Enforcement; Bush Issues Racial Profiling Ban But
Exempts Security Inquiries, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 18, 2003, at Al; Dan Malone,
Racial Profiling Ban Takes Effect: NAACP Leader Touts States Law on Traffic Stops, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 1, 2002, at A25; Connie Piloto, Racial Profiling Report's Useful-
ness Under Scrutiny Data Show Hispanics Searched Most; Records Not Kept For Every
Stop, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16, 2003, at IV; Anuradha Raghunathan, Texas
Shows Highest Rates of Subprime Lending: Experts Worry About Potential for Increase in
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2001, the newspaper published two articles on racial profiling, both deal-
ing with compliance of Texas's racial profiling law. 19 2 On the day the law
became effective, the newspaper published an article on the phenomenon
known as "driving while black," reminding readers of previously re-
ported incidents in which minority motorists were twice as likely to be
searched by Department of Public Safety troopers, even though "Whites
who were searched were twice as likely to be arrested."' 93 That same
year produced no less than three more articles on the subject, ranging
from former American Airlines Chairman and CEO, Robert Crandall,
advocating for racial profiling as a security measure for interdiction of
terrorism, 194 to allegations of Hispanics being singled out by the Grand
Prairie, Texas police department,195 to assertions of racial profiling play-
ing a role in subprime lending in Texas.' 96
In 2003, a flurry of articles ensued. 197 With fresh data trickling in, and
journalists getting their first full glimpse of it, police statewide suddenly
found themselves on the defensive.' 98 African-Americans and Hispanics
in Garland, Texas, reported The Dallas Morning News, were more prone
to arrest concomitant with motor vehicle stops than Whites or Asians.1 99
Predatory Practices, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 12, 2002, at D1; Stephanie Sandoval,
Race Gap Exists in Searches; Police Say Traffic-Stop Data Show No Profiling of Hispanics,
Blacks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 6, 2003, at Yi; Jason Trahan, Area Police Agencies
Seek Funds for Cameras Under Profiling Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 23, 2001, at
A40; Connie Piloto, Police Ready to Prevent Profiling: Money for Cameras to Record Stops
Hinges on Nov. 6 Board Vote, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3, 2001, at A29; Jason Tra-
han, Hispanics Searched More Often; Views Differ on Whether Traffic Stop Data Signal
Racial Profiling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 4, 2002, at Y1.
192. Piloto, Police Ready to Prevent Profiling, supra note 191; Trahan, Hispanics
Searched More Often, supra note 191.
193. Malone, supra note 191.
194. Fairbank, supra note 191.
195. Trahan, Hispanics Searched More Often, supra note 191.
196. Raghunathan, supra note 191.
197. See, e.g., Abshire, Forum Addresses Race, Traffic Stops, supra note 191; Abshire,
Race Gaps in Search, Arrest Rates Seen, supra note 191; Bell, Report: Blacks Pulled Over at
Higher Rate, supra note 191; Booth, supra note 191; Dennis, supra note 191; Eiserer, supra
note 191; Eiserer, Man Suggests Race Played Role In Stop, supra note 191; Emily, supra
note 191; Krause, supra note 191; Lichtblau, supra note 191; Piloto, Racial Profiling Re-
port's Usefulness Under Scrutiny Data Show Hispanics Searched Most, supra note 191;
Sandoval, supra note 191.
198. See, e.g., Abshire, Forum Addresses Race, Traffic Stops, supra note 191; Abshire,
Race Gaps in Search, Arrest Rates Seen, supra note 191; Bell, Report, supra note 191;
Booth, supra note 191; Dennis, supra note 191; Eiserer, Man Suggests Race Played Role In
Stop, supra note 191; Eiserer, Blacks, Hispanics Subjected to More Traffic-Stop Searches,
supra note 191; Emily, supra note 191, Krause, supra note 191; Lichtblau, supra note 191;
Piloto, Racial Profiling Report's Usefulness Under Scrutiny Data Show Hispanics Searched
Most, supra note 191; Sandoval, supra note 191.
199. Abshire, Race Gaps in Search, Arrest Rates Seen, supra note 191.
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Garland Police Chief Larry Wilson denied the allegations.2° In March, a
similar finding was published in Dallas, Texas. Former Dallas Police
Chief, Terrell Bolton, dismissed such allegations as "premature.",20 ' Simi-
lar findings on search rates for Hispanics were found in Highland Park,
Dallas County, University Park, and McKinney.2 °2 African-Americans
were found to be searched more often than Hispanics or Whites in Ar-
lington, Fort Worth, and Denton.2 °3 Two days later, Allen, Frisco, Mc-
Kinney, and Plano underwent scrutiny for their arrest rates of
Hispanics.204 Law enforcement denied it and characterized the issue as
"way early in the game., 20 5 That same day, Grand Prairie was again
targeted for its practices against African-American and Hispanic drivers,
this time with the benefit of data collected during 2002.206 Police Chief
Glen Hill repudiated reliance on "way-out-of-kilter statistics one way or
the other.,2 7 The next day, officials in Grapevine and Southlake, Texas
announced that the 2002 traffic stop data reflected "no indications of sys-
temic racial profiling., 20 8 Reports continued: African-Americans and
Hispanics in Lewisville are more than twice as likely than Whites to be
searched pursuant to traffic stops; 209 while in Mesquite, only African-
Americans were more likely than other races or ethnic groups to be
searched concomitant with traffic stops; 210 data in Garland show police
arrested twice as many Hispanic and Black motorists than any other
race;211 Irving police "searched Hispanics slightly more than any other
race;,'212 more African-Americans searched and arrested than any other
racial group in "every southwest Dallas County city," including Cedar
Hill, DeSoto, Duncanville, and Lancaster.213
Finally, there was the unfortunate incident involving African-American
businessman, Mr. Matthew Turner, an Air Force Reserve Captain, MIT
and Harvard Business School graduate, who was handcuffed, arrested,
200. Id.
201. Eiserer, Blacks, Hispanics Subjected to More Traffic-Stop Searches, supra note
191.
202. See id.; see also Emily, supra note 191; Krause, supra note 191.
203. Eiserer, Blacks, Hispanics Subjected to More Traffic-Stop Searches, supra note
191.
204. Emily, supra note 191.
205. Id.
206. Sandoval, supra note 191.
207. Id.
208. Dennis, supra note 191.
209. Krause, supra note 191.
210. Bell, supra note 191.
211. Abshire, Forum Addresses Race, Traffic Stops, supra note 191.
212. Piloto, Racial Profiling Report's Usefulness Under Scrutiny, supra note 191.
213. Booth, supra note 191.
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then released after about an hour, on suspicion of failure to stop and
render aid (hit and run) while in Dallas on business.2 14 He was the wrong
man.215 The culprit, it seems, was White.216
Given this lengthy, abstruse and convoluted background, is it any won-
der why so much of the controversy over racial profiling revolves around
the fundamental question, "What is it?" Even if reasonable minds could
eventually agree on what it is, distinguishing it out from facially-benign
practices or patterns deeply-embedded in law enforcement institutions is
no mean feat. One hopes that the current state of disarray will not instill
renewed vitality into Justice Potter Stewart's trenchant analysis of ob-
scenity in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio: "But I know it when I see
it.,217
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
"Goodness gracious! Anybody hurt?"
"No'm, Killed a nigger."
Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn218
At least since 1999, racial profiling has commanded the attention of the
legislative and executive branches of the federal government. That same
year, President Bill Clinton directed all federal law enforcement agencies
to document and report the race and ethnicity of suspects detained and
searched.219 In 2001, Congressman John Conyers, Jr. (D. 14 h Dist., Mich-
igan) introduced a bill entitled the "End Racial Profiling Act," requiring
racial data collection by all agencies that receive federal funds.22 0 This
and similar bills introduced at the federal level have never been
enacted.221
214. Eiserer, Man Suggests Race Played Role In Stop, supra note 191.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
218. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 373 (Planet PDF,
2004) (1884), available at http://www.planetpdf.com/planetpdf/pdfs/free-ebooks/The_Ad-
venturesofHuckleberryFinnT.pdf.
219. TEx. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., RACIAL PROFILING
CHARGES: How SHOULD TEXAS RESPOND?, S. 76-25, 1st Sess., at 1 (2000).
220. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001); see also, S. 989,
107th Cong. (2001).
221. See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Act of 2005, S. 2138, 109th Cong. (2005); End Ra-
cial Profiling Act of 2004, H.R. 3847, 108th Cong. (2004); Racial Profiling Education and
Awareness Act of 2002, S. 2114, 107th Cong. (2002); End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 H.R.
2074, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 989; Racial Profiling Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 1907, 107th
Cong. (2001).
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The Texas Department of Public Safety was created on August 10, 1935
to enforce laws related to public safety, and to detect and prevent
crime. 222 It was originally composed of six divisions - the Texas Highway
Patrol, the Texas Rangers, and Bureaus of Communications, Intelligence,
Education, and Identification and Records, all overseen by a three mem-
ber commission appointed by the Governor to six-year terms.223 The en-
abling statute has been codified in the Texas Government Code which
currently defines the Department as consisting of the Texas Rangers, the
Texas Highway Patrol, the administrative division, "and other divisions
that the commission considers necessary., 224 Commissioned Rangers
and officers are peace officers, 225 whose mandate is "to preserve the
peace within their [the officer's] jurisdiction., 226 Their powers include
crime suppression and "interference without warrant," execution of law-
ful judicial process, notifying magistrates of criminal offenses which an
officer "has good reason to believe" have been committed in the officer's
jurisdiction, arresting criminal offenders "without warrant" and taking
them before a proper magistrate, and certain child custody powers. 27
The Texas Highway Patrol consists of the chief patrol officer, captains,
sergeants, privates, as well as administrative and clerical personnel.228
"The chief patrol officer is the executive officer" of the Highway Pa-
trol.229 Highway Patrol officers have the power and authority of the
Texas Rangers.230 Texas Rangers have the powers and duties of sheriffs,
in addition to making arrests, executing criminal process "in any county,"
and if ordered by a court of record, executing process in civil cases.231
Therefore, one can conclude, that the law enforcement jurisdiction of
DPS officers in Texas for all practical purposes is plenary.
Racial profiling by any Texas peace officer is prohibited.232 When an
officer stops a driver or pedestrian for any alleged violation, they must
collect, and report to their employing agency, data pertaining to the sus-
pect's physical description, gender, and "race or ethnicity," as disclosed
222. Laurie E. Jasinski, Texas Department of Public Safety, The Handbook of Texas
Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/TT/mctrp.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2006).
223. Id.
224. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.002(a) (Vernon 2005).
225. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.12(4) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
226. TEX. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 2.13(a) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
227. TEX. CODE CRAM. PRoc. ANN. art. 2.13(b) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
228. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.031 (Vernon 2005).
229. § 411.031.
230. TEX. Gov'T CODE AN. § 411.032 (Vernon 2005).
231. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.022(a) (Vernon 2005).
232. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.131 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
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by the suspect to the officer.2 33 If a suspect refuses to disclose the infor-
mation, then the officer must record the race or ethnicity "as determined
by the officer to the best of the officer's ability., 234 Law enforcement
agencies are required to "compile and analyze" these data, and no later
than March 1 of every year, submit to the agency's appropriate governing
authority a report disclosing the data collected during the prior calendar
year.235 At a minimum, the report must include a "comparative analysis"
of the data, for the purpose of ascertaining the "prevalence," if any, of
racial profiling occurring within the agency, an examination of disposition
of stops, including searches, and a compilation of complaints against of-
ficers within the agency alleging incidents of racial profiling.236
The racial profiling statute applies to all municipal, county, state, and
"other political subdivisions" (e.g., educational institutions, transit and
airport authorities) that employ peace officers who make stops in
Texas.2 37 As defined by the statute, "race or ethnicity" means "of a par-
ticular descent, including Caucasian, African, Hispanic, Asian, or Native
American . . .,,238 All Texas law enforcement agencies are required to
promulgate a "detailed written policy" including:
(1) a definition of racial profiling;
(2) a ban against officers from engaging in racial profiling;
(3) a complaint procedure for persons who believe they have been
subject to racial profiling;
(4) a public education program about the racial profiling complaint
procedure;
(5) a program for remediation of officers found to have engaged in
racial profiling; and
(6) a requirement for data collection, including the suspect's race or
ethnicity, and whether a search was conducted (including whether
consensual or not), whenever a traffic stop resulted in issuance of a
citation.239
One problematic provision in the statutory scheme is exemption from
articles 2.133 and 2.134 data collection requirements for law enforcement
agencies and individual officers, if the agency equips its vehicles and
motorcycles with video cameras to record data.24° While video cameras
233. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.133(b) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
234. § 2.133(b).
235. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.134(b) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
236. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.134(c)(1) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
237. § 2.134(c)(1).
238. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(a)(2) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
239. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(b) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005).
240. art. 2.132(b).
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may be capable of accurately memorializing visual and audio data, it
would be a monumental, if not insurmountable, task to organize and
manage these data into a meaningful quantitative format for statistical
analysis. In examining racial profiling, for example, how many stops were
made, how many stops resulted in searches, how many searches were con-
sensual or the result of probable cause, how many suspects of each race
or ethnicity were searched, and discovery of contraband, are but some of
the more salient variables that require quantification.241 Although such
variables could conceivably be gleaned from videotape, it would require a
staff of technicians to view and interpret the images while recording the
data, which of course, leaves room for human bias and contamination in
translation of images into quantified format. Perhaps video data could
prove useful in proving instances of disparate treatment (individualized
animus) against a particular suspect, but it might well be worthless for
analyzing disparate impact against groups-at-large, i.e., wholesale racial
profiling.242 Unless or until this conundrum is resolved, use of video cam-
eras to memorialize data, as attractive as the idea may seem, will prove to
be of dubious value in detecting racial profiling.
Statutory construction of this exemption results in a serious ambigu-
ity.243 The video camera exemption does not apply to "the collection or
reporting requirements under Article 2.132" of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure.244 Article 2.132 requires agencies to collect data on racial
profiling. 245 But individual officers are exempt from reporting require-
ments under article 2.133, and agencies are exempt from "compilation,
analysis, and reporting requirements under Article 2.134" if video equip-
ment is employed. 24 6 The gravamen of the ambiguity is which section (if
any) of the article 2.132 collection and reporting requirement remains in-
tact if an agency employs video equipment? It would appear to be the
Article 2.132(b) (7) annual report of the agency to its political governing
authority.247 But if individual officers are exempt from collecting and re-
porting racial profiling data, as well as agencies being exempt from com-
241. For examples of how such studies are conducted please consult the following
sources: WITHROW, supra note 170; Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 109; STEWARD &
BERG, supra note 175.
242. This position has been adopted by the American Civil Liberties Union. See The
Benefits of Audio-Visual Technology in Addressing Racial Profiling: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 117-19 (2001) (statement of Rachel
King, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_house-hearings&docid=f:77191.pdf.
243. art. 2.132(b).
244. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.135(c) (Vernon 2005).
245. art. 2.132(b).
246. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.135(a)(1) (Vernon 2005).
247. art. 2.132(b)(7).
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piling and analyzing those data, which substantive requirements remain
resolute? Only a vast conglomeration of videotapes it seems. And if that
were all that remained, how could an agency possibly compile its annual
report for submission to its governing authority under Article 2.132(b)
(7)? Simply dump all annual videotapes at city hall and let the public sort
through them? That may very well be the case with the statute as cur-
rently written.
It thus appears the statutory effect of the video camera exemption re-
stricts racial profiling data to an atomistic level. If an individual were to
complain of racial profiling, a videotape of that particular arrest could be
retrieved for review.248 Use of videotape images, however, is practically
useless in managing the type of large scale quantitative data necessary for
meaningful policy purposes. To exacerbate matters, even the useful life
of the videotapes themselves is quite limited.249 Under Article 2.135, the
exemption section of the statute, agencies need to retain videotapes for
only 90 days following a stop, unless a citizen files a racial profiling com-
plaint against an individual officer, in which case that tape must be re-
tained pending resolution of the complaint.25 ° The upshot is that an
aggrieved citizen must act expeditiously in lodging a complaint, which in
all likelihood would necessitate retaining an attorney; otherwise the evi-
dence will be forever destroyed. 251 Such evisceration of the statutory re-
quirements might lend credibility to criticism that the Texas Legislature
may have been more interested in a placebo, rather than a prophylactic,
approach toward racial profiling, which ultimately fails to address the
problem. 2
Under its own administrative rules, as far as the Texas Department of
Public Safety is concerned, all typical black and white DPS patrol cruisers
have been video equipped, and all DPS troopers must videotape and
audiotape every stop they make. 3 DPS troopers are still required to
collect and report the data required by the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. 4 Under DPS rule 1.114, racial profiling is included in a laundry
list of major infractions, commission of any one of which could result in
248. See art. 2.135(b).
249. art. 2.135(b).
250. art. 2.135(b).
251. art. 2.135(b).
252. The debate over what measures would effectively prohibit the use of racial profil-
ing took place in the Texas Legislature during the 77th session. It appears that these con-
cerns were taken into consideration when crafting the current racial profiling statute. See
HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 219, at 6 (2000).
253. TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, TRAFFIC STOP DATA REPORT 4 (2000), available at
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director-staff/public-information/trafrep2q00.pdf.
254. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(a)(1) (Vernon 2005).
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discharge, suspension, demotion or removal of a trooper.255 Department
of Public Safety management also has issued a directive prohibiting vehi-
cle stops and/or searches based upon "race, ethnic origin, gender, or eco-
nomic status. ' 256 The video camera exemption, therefore, is not being
used by the DPS to circumvent quantitative data collection.
Finally, the Texas Education Code addresses the vital issue of educat-
ing law enforcement pertaining to racial profiling.257 At the top adminis-
trative level, the Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute
of Texas, responsible for providing initial and continuing education for
police chiefs, is directed to include a "program on racial profiling. '258 In-
cluded in the program must be "best practices" for monitoring peace of-
ficers' adherence to laws and agency regulations on racial profiling,
effectuating laws and regulations to prevent racial profiling, and collect-
ing and analyzing racial profiling data.2 59 Finally, in order to receive an
"intermediate proficiency certificate" in law enforcement, all peace of-
ficers must satisfactorily complete a training program on racial
profiling.2 6
Judicially, there is a dearth of published opinions addressing racial pro-
filing by appellate courts.2 6 ' In Texas, the only appellate opinions have
summarily dismissed claims of racial profiling, primarily due to a com-
plete lack of, or insufficient at best trial evidence.262 Evidence to support
the allegation, in other words, was either insufficient or non-existent at
trial, beyond the uncorroborated allegation or pleading of racial profil-
ing.263 In Ducksworth v. Texas,26 the appellant's pro se racial profiling
point of error was overruled due to the fact that there was no record
before the Court of Appeals.265 Racial profiling was raised as an issue in
a motion to suppress in Chambers v. Texas.266 Although the trial court's
overruling the motion was raised as an appellate point of error, the Court
255. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.114(b) (2004) (Public Safety and Corrections).
256. TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 253, at 3.
257. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 96.641 (Vernon 2005).
258. § 96.641.
259. § 96.6410).
260. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1701.402(e) (Vernon 2005).
261. See e.g., United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Sterling, 110
P.3d 1271 (Ariz. 2005); People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
262. Chambers v. State, No. 12-02-00116-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8466 (Tex. App.-
Tyler Nov. 27, 2002, pet. ref'd); Ducksworth v. State, Nos. 01-01-00065-CR, 01-01-00066-
CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4018 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] May 30, 2002, no pet.).
263. Chambers, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8466, at *15-17; Ducksworth, 2002 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4018, at *5-6.
264. Ducksworth, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4018.
265. Id. at *5-6.
266. Chambers, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8466, at *15-17.
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of Appeals failed to address the racial profiling issue.267 In one case
where the issue had been properly raised at trial, the evidence never went
beyond the uncorroborated testimony of the arresting officer, who unsur-
prisingly denied engaging in racial profiling on cross examination.268 In
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, one applicant alleged that "his
arrest was based solely upon racial profiling without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. ' '2 69 The trial court denied the writ, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of trial court discretion.270
In jurisdictions beyond Texas, several interesting racial profiling cases
have reached fruition, but none at the appellate level. All of these cases
have settled, some extremely expeditiously. Many have been filed by the
American Civil Liberties Union; one was filed by the United States; and
still another was filed against it. United States v. New Jersey271 was an
early attempt.272 Filed on December 22, 1999, and settled exactly one
week later, the state obviously was aware of the imminent filing of this
lawsuit.27 3 It was lodged by the U.S. Justice Department against New
Jersey and its state police agency, alleging racial profiling in traffic stops
and searches.274 Its purpose, to implement changes in the way the state
trained its troopers and how they conducted stops and searches, was re-
flected in a comprehensive settlement agreement and subsequent court
mandated status reports prepared by the New Jersey Attorney Gen-
eral.275 Under paragraph 29(a) of that agreement, the state has adopted
procedures for all its troopers, operating marked or unmarked vehicles,
to collect extensive written data relating to each stop and/or search. In-
cluded in the data are race, ethnicity, and gender of the driver and any
passengers asked "to exit the vehicle, frisked, searched, requested to con-
sent to a vehicle search, or arrested .. 276
267. Id.
268. Brumfield v. State, No. 09-01-509-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8965, at *4-5 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont Dec. 19, 2002, no pet.).
269. Ex Parte Brooks, 97 S.W.3d 639, 639 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
270. Id. at 640.
271. United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970 (U.S.D.C. NJ, Trenton, 1999).
"Progress/Status Summary of the Consent Decree Entered into by the United States of
America and the State of New Jersey Regarding the New Jersey Division of State Police."
State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety Office of the Attorney General
(Apr. 27, 2000).
272. Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970, 1 (U.S.D.C. N.J.
Trenton 1999).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970 (U.S.D.C. N.J.
Trenton 1999).
276. United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-CV-5970 (U.S.D.C. NJ, Trenton, 1999).
"Progress/Status Summary of the Consent Decree Entered into by the United States of
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Also in New Jersey a civil action was filed by the ACLU.277 The plain-
tiffs were African-Americans.278 Thomas White, a retired corrections of-
ficer from Philadelphia, Fred Hamiel, a former hair salon owner (also
retired), and Tyrone Hamilton, a juvenile corrections officer, had been
stopped and searched on the New Jersey State Turnpike.279 All three had
been stopped twice before on the same turnpike.28' Thomas White was
never issued a ticket.281 Tyrone Hamilton was stopped, released without
charge, then stopped again minutes later by a different trooper, who con-
fided in him that if he had told the trooper he was a corrections officer,
the trooper would not have issued him a ticket.282 Both Fred Hamiel and
his brother, whose leg was in a cast, were ordered out of their car and
subjected to total body frisks and a vehicle search. 283 This was the second
such incident for Hamiel.28 Three years after the suit was filed, the New
Jersey State Police agreed to pay the plaintiffs a total of $250,000.285
In another New Jersey suit filed in state court,286 the state agreed to
pay Morka, an Egyptian-American, Maher, a Nigerian national, and ten
other plaintiffs a total of $775,370 as settlement.287 Of this amount,
$100,000 was contributed by the New Jersey Turnpike Authority.288 Ac-
cording to the allegations of the suit, Morka was physically assaulted and
Maher was threatened with a gun held to her by troopers on the turn-
pike.289 When the plaintiffs tried to file an internal complaint, they were
provided the wrong forms.29° Subsequently, the police neglected or re-
fused to finalize an investigation of the complaint.291
America and the State of New Jersey Regarding the New Jersey Division of State Police."
State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety Office of the Attorney General
(Apr. 27, 2000).
277. White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D. 123 (D. N.J. 2002).
278. Id. at 125.
279. Id. at 125-29.
280. Id. at 126-29.
281. Id. at 127.
282. White, 208 F.R.D. at 128.
283. Id. at 127.
284. Id.
285. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of PA Secures Settlement
for NJ Turnpike Racial Profiling Victims (Aug. 20, 2002), http://www.aclu.org//racialjustice/
racialprofiling/15857prs2002O820.html.
286. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of NJ Wins $775,000 for
Victims of Racial Profiling by State Troopers (Jan. 13, 2003), http://www.aclu.org//racialjus-
tice/racialprofiling/15871prs2003Oll3.html.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 286.
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In other noteworthy cases across the country, the ACLU has obtained
settlements from the state of Maryland,292 and the California Highway
Patrol (CHP).29 3 Other jurisdictions still resting in the crosshairs of the
ACLU include West Virginia,294 Illinois,295 Rhode Island,296 and even the
United States itself.297 Notably, Texas is not on the list.
The ACLU has successfully sued the United States Transportation Se-
curity Administration for alleged racial profiling.298 Rajcoomar v. United
States,29 9 was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on April 14, 2003"0 and was settled about 10
weeks later, on June 30, 2003.3°1 Suit was filed pursuant to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, other statutory authorities, and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.3 °2
Rajcoomar, a doctor and former Lieutenant Colonel in the United
States Army Reserve, and his wife were passengers on a commercial air-
292. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Civil Rights Groups and
Maryland Officials Reach Landmark Racial Profiling Settlement (Apr. 2, 2003), http://www.
aclu.org//racialjustice/racialprofiling/15888prs20030402.html.
293. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Northern CA Hails
Landmark Racial Profiling Settlement (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.aclu.org//racialjustice/ra-
cialprofiling/15875prs20030227.html.
294. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of West Virginia Marks
One Year Anniversary of Racial Profiling Incident by Filing Lawsuit Against Charleston
Police (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.aclu.org//racialjustice/racialprofiling/15882prs2003430.
html.
295. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Residents; Fight Racial
Profiling in Illinois (Mar. 17, 2003), http://www.aclu.org//racialjustice/racialprofiling/15894
res20030317.html.
296. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, New State Study Confirms Ram-
pant Racial Profiling in Rhode Island; ACLU, Community Groups Call for "Concrete Ac-
tion" (July 1, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/15808prs2003O7Ol.
html.
297. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says New Justice Depart-
ment Racial Profiling Policy Lacks Enforcement Tool, Suffers From Huge National Security
Loophole (June 17, 2003), http://www.aclu.org//racialjustice/racialprofiling/15810prs200306
17.
298. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Government Settles ACLU's Ra-
cial Profiling Lawsuit Against TSA, Agrees to Alter Agency Procedures Nationwide (July
31, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/16806prs20030731.html.
299. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Complaint in Racial Profiling
Lawsuit Against Transportation Security Administration (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.aclufl.
org/legislature-courts/legal-department/briefs-complaints/rajcoomarcomplaint.cfm.
300. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 299.
301. Rajcoomar v. United States, No. 2:03-cv-02294-JF (D. Pa. 2003) (PACER).
302. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 299.
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liner flying from Atlanta to Philadelphia. °3 According to one source,
following a disturbance on the plane, in which the Rajcoomars played no
part, U.S. "air marshals held passengers at gunpoint and refused to allow
anyone to get up." 3" Upon arrival in Philadelphia, Dr. Rajcoomar was
placed in police custody and taken to jail.3" 5 He and his belongings were
searched.30 6 After asking why he had been arrested, he was refused ex-
planation. 307 He was booked and held in a "foul-smelling cell" for four
hours.30 ' According to the complaint, "the only explanation ever pro-
vided by the TSA agents consisted of the following two statements:"
(i) "We didn't like the way you look," and
(ii) "We didn't like the way you looked at us." 30 9
A TSA spokesperson maintained that Dr. Rajcoomar "had been ob-
serving [the air marshals] too closely" aboard the flight.310 Damages of
$50,000 were awarded to Dr. Rajcoomar.311
In Texas, only one published appellate opinion has at least obliquely
addressed the issue of racial profiling.3 2 Edward Pruneda was found
guilty of possessing less than 2000, but more than 50 pounds of marijuana,
and had been stopped for speeding by DPS Trooper Bob Powell.313 After
being told that Powell would request the canine unit if Pruneda refused to
a consensual search, Pruneda consented.314 The trial court denied
Pruneda's requested jury instruction on racial profiling, which Pruneda
raised on appeal as point of error number one.315 Acknowledging the
statutory prohibition against its use, the Court of Appeals agreed that any
evidence seized in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights must be
excluded from consideration at trial.316
A trial court is required to include an Article 38.23 instruction [to dis-
regard illegally obtained evidence] in the jury charge only if there is a
factual dispute as to how the evidence was obtained. However there was
303. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Files Racial Profiling
Lawsuit Against Transportation Security Administration (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.aclu.
org//safefree/general/17339prs20030414.
304. Id.
305. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 299.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 303.
311. Rajcoomar v. United States, No. 2:03-cv-02294-JF (D. Pa. 2003).
312. Pruneda v. Texas, 104 S.W. 3d 302 (Tex. App. - Texarkana, 2003, pet. ref'd).
313. Id. at 304.
314. Id. at 304-05.
315. Id. at 305.
316. Id.
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no evidence presented at trial to show the further detention of Pruneda
was based on racial profiling.317
The only evidence of racial profiling elicited at trial was defense coun-
sel's cross examination of Powell, as follows:
[Q:] The decision to keep him from beyond - the decision that in-
stead of issuing a warning ticket, you're going to call for the canine
unit, call for the backup, and hold him there further, was that, in any
way, based on the fact that he's Hispanic and out of state?
[A:] No, sir, I stop a lot of people on the side of the road. I had no
idea who he was when I stop [sic] the vehicle. At the time I stopped
the vehicle, whether or not he's Hispanic, white, black, Asian, it
doesn't matter to me. If I feel like everything's okay, I will let them
go. But under the circumstances, and under my past experience of
working as a Trooper on the highways, that's the reason I kept him.
I thought there was enough [probable cause] to ... ask him for his
consent to search the vehicle.318
The Court noted by dicta that no statistical evidence was presented at
trial that either the law enforcement agency or the arresting officer had
engaged in racial profiling.319 From this, attorneys should be acutely
aware that if a criminal defendant, or a plaintiff in a civil suit, expects to
rely upon racial profiling as either sword or shield, the issue should be
properly pleaded and proven by competent expert testimony and statis-
tics. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust:32 ° "[C]ausation must be proved.... Our formulations, which have
never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have con-
sistently stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial
that they raise such an inference of causation."3 ' Mere allegation, innu-
endo, or uncorroborated testimony will be insufficient to support any
claim of racial profiling.322
What then are the origins of racial profiling by state officials? Harris
attributes it to a bastardization of a "means of identifying drug couriers
on the highways in the 1980s," devised by Sheriff Bob Vogel of the Volu-
sia County, Florida Sheriff's Department.323 Race, according to that au-
thor's description of Vogel's technique, "was never part of his method; it
317. Pruneda, 104 S.W.3d at 305.
318. Id. at 305-06.
319. Id. at 306.
320. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
321. Id. at 994-95.
322. Id.
323. See HARRIS, supra note 150, at 62.
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was never a factor. 324 It was supposed to have been racially benign.325
It was Operation Pipeline, the brainchild of the United States Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA), according to both Harris, and Gross and
Barnes (2002), that provided the impetus for using race as a proxy varia-
ble for predicting proclivity for couriering drugs.32 6
So how did the transformation from a purportedly racially benign ori-
gin to a racially relevant law enforcement technique evolve? According
to Harris, and Gross and Barnes, the culprit is training.327 Visual aids,
such as training videos promulgated by the DEA and distributed to law
enforcement agencies nationwide, tended to characterize particular racial
groups as fitting the profile of drug dealers. 328 As noted in a 1999 DEA
report cited by Harris: "Predominant wholesale traffickers are Colum-
bian, followed by Dominicans, Chinese, West African/Nigerian, Pakistani,
Hispanic, and Indian. Midlevels are dominated by Dominicans, Columbi-
ans, Puerto Ricans, African-Americans and Nigerians., 329
Quoting allegations surrounding a lawsuit brought by Colonel Carl
Williams, fired from his position with the New Jersey State Police, Gross
and Barnes cite Williams' averment that racial profiling was essentially
good policing.330 Williams averred that according to the website posted
by the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, "in Trenton,
New Jersey, 'crack dealers are predominantly African-American males,'
powder cocaine dealers are 'predominantly Latino,' heroin traffickers are
'mostly Latinos,' and the marijuana market is 'controlled by Jamai-
cans.'"331 If racial profiling exists at an institutional level in the Texas
Department of Public Safety, it can be a function of one or several fac-
tors, or a combination of them. Preexisting racial prejudices on the part
of individual troopers, embedded stereotypes reinforced by institutional
practices, tradition, pure chance (white noise), or any combination of
them, may be possible.
Equally vexing, is how racially charged images embed themselves into
high level law enforcement in the first place? While absolute certainty is
never attainable, the answer may lie in the human propensity to stereo-
type. Stereotyping, or to generalize based upon perceptions, is a normal
324. Id. at 48.
325. Id.
326. Id.; see also Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profil-
ing and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REv. 651, 671-72 (2002).
327. See HARRIS, supra note 150, at 48; see also, Gross & Barnes, supra note 326, at
671-72.
328. See HARRIS, supra note 150, at 49-50.
329. Id. at 49.
330. Gross & Barnes, supra note 326, at 653-54.
331. Id. at 654.
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human trait. Psychologists proffer two diverging theories for the human
tendency to stereotype - motivational and social cognition.332
In 1932, Katz and Braly3 33 conducted an experiment, known as the trait
checklist, in which 100 Princeton University students were provided a list
of 84 personality traits, such as industrious, intelligent, frugal, and artis-
tic. 3 3 4 Subjects were asked to match those traits with ten ethnic groups
and nationalities, such as English, German, Italian, Jewish, and Black.3 35
That there was a high degree of consensus among the subjects as to group
characteristics led the authors to conclude that stereotypes shared com-
monalities. 336 Thus, among the subjects of the study, the English were
perceived as sportsmanlike and traditional, Americans as materialistic
and ambitious, and Germans as industrious.337 Replications by Gilbert 338
and Karlins339 resulted in similar findings over a 35 year period.340 Such
robustness across time and subjects led psychologists to infer that stereo-
types were the result of inaccurate and inflexible thinking.34' Katz and
Braly argued their study led to the conclusion that stereotypes arose only
"so long as individuals accept consciously or unconsciously the group fal-
lacy attitude toward place of birth and skin colour.,
342
Following the footsteps of Katz and Braly, motivational theorists held
that stereotyping was the result of faulty thinking, especially insofar as
derogatory stereotypes were perpetrated.343 From this it was surmised
that stereotypical thinking should be corrected, because it reflected false
and prejudicial notions of reality.344 Brigham, for example, held that
"most writers agree that stereotypes are undesirable and should be eradi-
cated. '' 345 The touchstone of motivational theory assumes that anti-social
stereotypes involve some degree of rationality, intent, or motivation.346
332. PERRY R. HINTON, STEREOTYPES, COGNITION AND CULTURE 14, 20 (2000).
333. Id. at 9-10.
334. D. Katz & K.W. Braly, Racial Prejudice and Racial Stereotypes, 30 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 175 (1933), construed in HINTON, supra note 332, at 10.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. G.M. Gilbert, Stereotype Persistence and Change Among College Students, 46 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 254 (1951).
339. Marvin Karlins et al., On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three Gener-
ations of College Students, 13 J. PERS. & Soc. Psychol. 1 (1969).
340. Id. at 2, 5-8; see also Gilbert, supra note 338, at 246-52.
341. Karlins et al., supra note 339, at 2, 5-8; see also Gilbert, supra note 338, at 246-52.
342. Katz & Braly, supra note 334.
343. See HIrNrroN, supra note 332, at 11.
344. Id.
345. John C. Brigham, Ethnic Stereotypes, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 15, 30 (1971).
See HINTON, supra note 332, at 11.
346. Id. at 14-19.
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At least a modicum of will, ill will - animus - in the case of derogatory
stereotypes, toward the subject of derision need be present in the mind of
the subject. 347
Social cognition theory, on the other hand, maintains that as products
of their environment and culture, human beings make decisions filtered
through a cognitive lens.3 48 This lens, which everyone acquires at birth
and evolves until death, inheres in the human instinct to group objects
according to sameness. 349 Early experiments by prominent psychologists
revealed that humans tended to exaggerate differences among identical
objects when those objects were placed into different groups. 350 Moreo-
ver, they tended to overstate similarities among those same objects when
placed into the same group.35 1 From these experiments, it was concluded
that subjects tended to stereotype objects according to group member-
ship, a phenomenon Tajfel and Wilkes labeled "groupness. ' 352
Motivational theory, as it attempted to explain bias, prejudice, and dis-
crimination, treated groupness as aberrational in that it tended to focus
upon the anti-social aspects of the phenomenon of interest, such as stere-
otyping. According to social cognition, intent is irrelevant.354 A major
premise of social cognition is that stereotyping is not an aberrant form of
behavior arising out of hostility or ill will, but rational, normal behavior
"no different from other categorization-related constructs., 355
As a means of information processing, the human need to categorize is
the byproduct of an instinct to avoid sensory overload.356 Humans group
objects, ideas, facts, and people into categories that cause decisions to
flow easier and faster than if they attempted to analyze them on an ad
hoc basis.357 Thus, humans resort to construct heuristics, or mental short-
cuts, in making decisions.358 They tend to categorize people according to
groups with which they personally identify.359 People who most closely
347. Id. at 11.
348. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1186-87 (1995).
349. See HINTON, supra note 332, at 106.
350. Id. at 111-12.
351. Id. at 112.
352. Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. Soc. ISSUEs 79,
83-86 (1969), construed in Krieger, supra note 348, at 1186-87.
353. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1186-88.
354. Id. at 1188.
355. Id. at 1186-87.
356. See HINTON, supra note 332, at 32.
357. Id. at 31-35.
358. Id.
359. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1188-89.
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resemble a particular group tend to identify with that group and its con-
stituents; whereas members who do not fit into that particular group must
be members of some out-group. 360 The result is an in-group/out-group
dichotomy, which in a social milieu can be problematic because it results
in an us against them mentality.361 Even more problematic is that
humans tend to invest scarce time and resources, physical, mental and
emotional, in distinguishing between particular traits and characteristics
among their own in-group members, while declining to invest similar
scarce resources to distinguish among members of out-groups. 362 The im-
plication is that according to members of the in-group, their own mem-
bers may vary among one another, whereas members of the out-group
are perceived as all being alike, something psychologists call
homogeneity. 363
Stereotyping operates in a manner similar to groupness, in that objects
or people in the same group are perceived as being more homogenous
than if they belonged to different groups, or than if they were viewed in
the aggregate population-at-large.364 Such was the lesson of the lines of
Tajfel and Wilkes.36 5 Subjects presented with lines each varying by a con-
sistent five percent ratio, identified the lines belonging to the same group
as having less variation than similar lines separated by groups.3 66 Al-
though the lines were the exact same length, when they were placed into
separate groups, subjects tended to find more similarity among the lines
within groups than between them.36 7
A natural progression from stereotyping is the formation of mental
prototypes, something cognitive psychologists label "schemas. ''368
Schemas are an amalgamation into a simple snapshot of perceptions, or
discrete frames, of reality.369 Before incoming information can become
focused in the human mind, it first passes through a schematic lens.37°
This lens causes the information to become focused quickly and
sharply. 371 The price of this efficiency is bias in the perception of incom-
360. Id. at 1189-90.
361. Id. at 1192.
362. Id. at 1193.
363. Id. at 1192.
364. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1198.
365. Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgment, 54 BRIT. J.
PSYCHOL. 101 (1963), construed in HINTON, supra note 332, at 111.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1188, 1999.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1202.
371. Id. at 1190.
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ing information, since the lens is not clear, but clouded. 372 Cloudiness
results in fogging powers of reason, thereby biasing "judgment long
before the 'moment of decision.' 373
Schemas that have evolved through a stereotypical lens exhibit a high
mental correlation with certain traits associated with different groups of
people.374 When these traits reflect perceived notions of reality, although
they are not objectively correct, they are said to be "illusory," giving rise
to the shibboleth "illusory correlation., 375 According to Hamilton, illu-
sory correlations harbor ominous implications for racial minority
groups.376 When racial majority members experience little contact with
minority members, and they observe a single minority member in some
memorable act, they may infer a correlation between that act and all
members of the minority group.37 7 For racial profiling purposes, one
criminal act committed by a single minority member may result in attri-
bution of criminality to the entire minority group in the mind of the ma-
jority group member, even though concededly (and statistically) a
majority group member is just as likely to commit the same criminal act.
By unconsciously constructing prior mental expectations of how human
beings perceive reality, stereotypes, schemas, and person prototypes bias
powers of clear, intelligent reasoning.3
78
A corollary of this theory is that humans tend to attribute success and
highly desirable achievements to internal dispositional causes among
members of their own particular in-group.37 9 Success is achieved because
in-group members are intelligent, motivated, ambitious, and hard work-
ing. 38 0 For members of the out-group, however, success is due to external
causes and environmental factors, in the minds of in-group members.381
When an out-group member achieves something equally laudable as an
in-group member, it is due to some externality - public assistance, affirm-
ative action, or outside help.382 So powerful and prolific is this attribu-
372. ld.
373. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1188.
374. Id. at 1195.
375. Id.
376. D.L. Hamilton, A Cognitive Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 AD-
VANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., (L. Berkowitz ed., 1979), construed in HINTON,
supra note 332, at 111 (2000).
377. See HINTON, supra note 332, at 65-66.
378. Id. at 66.
379. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1207.
380. Id. at 1206.
381. Id. at 1207.
382. Id. at 1204.
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tion bias that it has become known as the "fundamental attribution
error. "383
Person prototypes, stereotypes, and schemas become particularly pro-
nounced in the presence of what psychologists call salience. 3 4 Attention
becomes focused upon the unusual instead of the common.385 Distinc-
tiveness becomes tantamount to salience.386 In a social setting, the result
may be that racial minority members become salient, or more carefully
observed, among racial majority members.38 7 Thus, meaning is given to
the old adage about being the only grain of salt in the pepper shaker, or
vice versa.
At this stage, prototypes, stereotypes, and schemas all coalesce into the
human memory of events. 388 Human subjects have found it easier to re-
member behavior which conformed to prior expectations than which dis-
confirmed, or were unrelated to them.38 9 But memories are hardly
inscribed upon a blank slate. First they must pass through the lens of
perception, as that lens has been shaped and clouded by prototypes, ste-
reotypes, and schemas - in other words, social biases.390 Recollection of
events is at least to some degree affected by bias; so information stored in
memory is also biased. 391
Social cognition theory is illustrated in a parable Krieger 39" relates
about a Salvadoran client of hers suing for employment discrimination.393
Krieger had been deposing the plant foreman in an attempt to determine
his motivation for treating her client differently and adversely from racial
majority employees. 394 Growing agitated over the ordeal, the foreman
spontaneously remarked that that the employee being a "Mexican" never
even entered his mind.3 95 Although at first taken aback, Krieger later
experienced an epiphany that something salient must have existed in the
mind of the foreman by virtue of the fact that he referred to her Salvado-
383. Id. at 1204-05.
384. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1193.
385. Id. at 1194.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1193.
388. Id. at 1194.
389. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1207 (1995).
390. Id. at 1202.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1162-64.
393. Id.
394. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1163.
395. Id. at 1164.
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ran client as a "Mexican. '39 6 By his thinking that all Hispanics were alike
(homogeneity) the foreman was living proof of person prototypes, stereo-
types, schemas, salience, and memory confirming experiences. 397 The up-
shot is none of such behavior is aberrational; indeed it is normal, so
neither motivation nor awareness need enter into the racial profiling
equation.398
Other prominent authors on the subject of race cite stereotyping as a
human survival mechanism.3 99 As infants, according to Loury,400 humans
learn to recognize patterns, then associate them with evolving expecta-
tions of reality.40 1 Early elementary examples include identification and
love of parents and friends, fear of strangers, acquisition of language
skills, and of course, color recognition.40 2 The latter presupposes arbi-
trariness. "What could be more arbitrary than the coordinating conven-
tion, stop on 'red' and go on 'green'?... The particular colors being used
here can have no intrinsic significance."4 "3 Yet, over time, even colors
acquire salience, however arbitrary that salience may be.404 Red is pro-
hibited; green is permitted. At some point, that which is green is good;
red is bad.40 5
Loury asks why racial stereotypes exist, and explores the consequences
of their existence as they affect African-Americans.40 6 As a matter of
survival, humans have an instinct to classify.40 7 Classification extends not
just to objects, but also to other humans.40 8 The process begins as early
as birth, when babies learn to recognize differences according to sensate
perception between things such as love and hate, safety and danger, hot
and cold, and colors.40 9 As they appear in, on, or part of, anything physi-
cal, Loury calls these differences "markers., 410 Marker identification is
crucial to human development and survival, since it would be impractical,
and in all probability, fatal, for people to reason logically through every
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See, e.g., LOURY, supra note 9, 17-54.
400. See LOURY, supra note 9.
401. Id. at 65-67.
402. Id. at 66.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 66.
406. Id. at 67.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 67-68.
409. Id. at 66.
410. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 65, 67 (2002).
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situation on a case by case basis.41 They must be able instantly to gener-
alize from recognition of specific traits to resultant outcomes.412 As
humans develop, they acquire this ability instantly to generalize based
upon identification of specific markers.413 This ability, in turn, becomes
automatic and subconscious.
"Aversive racism" is a term used by Dovidio and Gaertner 414 to de-
scribe subconscious racism.415 In their words, "many people who con-
sciously and sincerely support egalitarian principles and believe
themselves to be nonprejudiced also unconsciously harbor negative feel-
ings and beliefs about Blacks., 4 16 Feelings like these typically are charac-
terized by "avoidance" rather than overt hostility, and are better
described as biases than outward hatred.41 7
Cognition clouded by bias may be the result of normal human develop-
ment.41 8 People ascribe significance to commonplace symbols like colors,
which in and of themselves have no intrinsic significance.41 9 This ten-
dency is not inherently aberrant or socially reprehensible. 420 For without
a tendency to generalize meaning from symbols, human beings would be
unable to function throughout life.42 1 As temporal creatures, humans
simply lack the time and luxury of being able consciously to analyze every
word, object, or symbol that confronts them in life's daily routines.422
Mental paralysis and ultimately sheer mental chaos would result. 423 The
ability to generalize is part of the ability to survive as individuals and as a
species.424 It is pernicious generalizations, which Schauer describes as
lacking statistical or factual foundation, which ultimately lead to inimical,
as opposed to benign, stereotyping. 425 Racial stereotyping is an
example.42 6
411. Id. at 65-67.
412. Id. at 27.
413. Id. at 27-29.
414. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Affirmative Action, Unintentional Racial
Biases, and Intergroup Relations, 52 J. Soc. ISSUES 51 (1996).
415. Id. at 53.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 53-54.
418. Krieger, supra note 348, at 1200.
419. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 66.
420. See HINTON, supra note 332, at 32.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 31-35.
423. Id. at 32.
424. For a discussion of the positive aspects of generalization, see FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 288-98 (2003).
425. See SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 7.
426. Id. at 22.
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Commonality of stereotypes is their banality. Blacks are indolent.
Jews are niggardly. Hispanics are unctuous. Asians are mendacious.
People with physical or mental disabilities are unreliable workers, and, of
course, is the ubiquitous blondes are dumb (but have more fun). A stere-
otype for everyone and for everyone a stereotype seems to be axiomatic.
The point is, although stereotypes make life easier, they can be dangerous
if one comes to rely too much upon them. They often attain a life of their
own, replicating themselves in what Loury calls "self-confirming stereo-
types." '4 2 7 "Observers, by acting upon the generalization, set in motion a
sequence of events that has the effect of reinforcing their initial judg-
ment." '428 It is from this propensity to draw in the observer, and others
associated with the observer, that springs the ultimate metamorphosis of
stereotyping - embeddedness.429
It is in this last stage of development that stereotypes become embed-
ded in culture.43 ° Every culture has its own peculiar stereotypes, and it
might be safe to say that so too do businesses, occupations, and profes-
sions, which are but a microcosm of the prevailing culture. Law enforce-
ment is a microcosm. At least, anecdotal evidence exists: "Columbia-
based traffickers continued to control wholesale level cocaine distribution
throughout the heavily populated northeastern United States. . . often
employing Dominican criminals as subordinates.... In major U.S. cities,
organized criminal groups of Cuban, Jamaican, and Mexican nationals, as
well as African-American and ethnic Dominican gangs, dominated the
retail market. 43
1
Negative stereotypes not only reinforce negativity in the mind of the
observer, but also in the mind of the victim. 432 "In this sense, negative
stereotypes constitute a 'self-fulfilling prophecy." 433 Steele and Aronson
labeled this stereotypical life cycle the "stereotype threat. '4 34 In their
terms, it is a "self-evaluative" threat, in that given sufficient social preva-
lence of the stereotype, the victim himself begins to act in conformance
427. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 23-29.
428. Id. at 23.
429. Loury approaches the subject of self-confirming stereotypes with the perspective
of an economist. He describes the final outcome of such stereotypes as a "resulting con-
vention" (or "equilibrium" to put it in starkly economic terms). See id. at 23-29.
430. Id. at 28.
431. NAT'L NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM., THE NNICC REPORT
1997: THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (1998) quoted in Gross
& Barnes, supra note 326, at 653.
432. See Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate
Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220 (1993).
433. Id. at 1221.
434. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995).
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with it, as well as actually believe it.4 3 5 When the victim, as well as the
observers, accept veracity of a negative stereotype, it creates a self .threat
"enough to have disruptive effects of its own.",4 3 6
An example is a study by Coate and Loury building upon earlier work
by Gary S. Becker, Kenneth J. Arrow and Edmund Phelps.4 37 The au-
thors devised a model to detect existence of employment discrimination
in assigning minority workers to lower paying jobs, even though they
were being paid equal wages for equal work.438 To the authors, any anal-
ysis of employment discrimination must begin with an investigation of
whether the employer may be discriminating by job assignment, rather
than wages, in that beneath job assignment may be lurking a more insidi-
ous form of discrimination than the relatively obvious nature of disparate
wages for similar work.4 39 Racial stereotypes may be the main driver be-
hind subordinate job assignment. 440 These stereotypes, in turn, create a
cycle among both employers and employees, thereby becoming "self-con-
firming" stereotypes441 - the self fulfilling prophecy of which Loury
warns.442 What Coate and Loury concluded was that so-called racial
color blindness is not entirely blind.4 43 If negative stereotypes reinforce
preconceived expectations, then the observers are actually "acting ration-
ally" by discriminating on the basis of color. 44 In the words of Neil
DeGrasse Tyson, one of seven African-American astrophysicists out of
4000 in 1991, the stereotype threat constitutes an "emotional tax," in the
form of "intellectual emasculation., 445
Given the existence of racial profiling, it is possible that the stereotype
threat may serve to create an endless loop. Not only is it the law enforce-
ment community that stereotypes racial minorities, but racial minorities
tend to stereotype officers of the law.44 6 Harris cites "the talk" (referring
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. See Coate & Loury, supra note 432, at 1222 (Becker developed the discrimina-
tion theory based on tastes and Arrow and Phelps explored discrimination based on a
statistical theory).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1224.
441. Id. at 1224-26.
442. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 23-26.
443. Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate
Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220, 1227 (1993).
444. Id.
445. Neil DeGrasse Tyson, Convocation Address at Columbia University (May 14,
1991), http://research.amnh.org/users/tyson/speeches/PhDConvocationAddress.html.
446. David Harris describes this "vicious cycle" in his famous Driving While Black
report. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 5. Further evidence of the cycle can be found in a
study conducted by Lundman and Kaufman, in which the researchers found that African-
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to the discussions that African-American parents often have with their
children about what to do when they are detained by law enforcement)
and how the subject came up during the debates surrounding the Conyers
racial profiling bill." 7 The Justice Department convened a summit in De-
cember 1998 to address race and traffic stops. 448 Among the speakers
was Saul Green, an African-American, who happened to be the United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan. 449 Although a high
level law enforcement official himself, Green felt uncomfortable among
his peers, as he related the time he cautioned his son about driving while
black.45 ° Obey all traffic laws, but if you are stopped by an officer you
are subject to racial profiling, even in Detroit, which has a large African-
American population.451
If stereotypes are so prolific, and make life simpler, then what is so
objectionable about them? Nothing in general; but for racial profiling
specifically, the objection is to using race qua race as the basis for making
cognitive decisions.452 Loury's definition of race provides some insight
into the subject of racial profiling:
[b]y the term "race"... I use that term to refer to a cluster of inherita-
ble bodily markings carried by a largely endogamous group of indi-
viduals, markings that can be observed by others with ease, that can be
changed or misrepresented only with great difficulty, and that have
come to be invested in a particular society at a given historical moment
with social meaning.453
It is in the latter part of that definition - social significance - wherein
lies the danger of racial stereotyping.454 Members of the human species
exhibit different ethnic characteristics, markers in the terminology of
Loury.45 5 What is unusual, however, is that over time these markers ac-
Americans and Hispanics were far more likely than whites to self-report that law enforce-
ment officers acted improperly during the execution of a traffic stop. See Lundman &
Kaufman, supra note 102, at 207.
447. See LOURY, supra note 9, at 107-15.
448. Id. at 107-08.
449. Id. at 108.
450. Id. at 108-09.
451. Id. at 109.
452. Many voices raise this objection, and call for the elimination of racial profiling
including most prominent law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FACT SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING 1 (2003), available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/asset
library/DOJ-racial-profiling.pdf; TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 253, at 3 (2000),
available at http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director-staff/public -information/trafrep2qOO.pdf.
453. See LoURY, supra note 9, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
454. Id. at 21-23.
455. Id. at 20-21.
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crue "something of import within [a]n historical context." '4 56 Culture also
plays a significant role.45 7 Skin color may be innate and indelible, but
race "is all about embodied social signification., 458 Based upon these
congenital markers, people tend subconsciously to attribute to others ex-
trinsic character traits, both positive and negative.459 From this tendency
to stereotype by congenital characteristics may emerge the phenomenon
known as racial profiling.
How this applies to the legal dialectic may be illustrated by discrimina-
tion law. Two legal theories underlying any type of discrimination law, be
it in employment, credit, education, or racial profiling, are disparate
treatment and disparate impact.460 Disparate treatment requires animus
(motivation) harbored against an individual or group; it is incumbent
upon the charging party to prove that they were treated differently from
the rest of the group, based upon some legally prohibited characteris-
tic. 4 61 Disparate impact carries no such burden.462 It is sufficient to
prove that a "facially neutral... practice has a significantly discriminatory
impact. ,461 Motivation is irrelevant.4 64 Both disparate treatment and
disparate impact must be proven in racial profiling cases.46 5
By analogy, the landmark decision on the issue of which theory applies
to charges of racial discrimination is Washington v. Davis,4 66 a class action
by African-American police officers against the District of Columbia Po-
lice Department.4 67 The officers alleged that the Department had been
administering a racially discriminatory literacy test as a condition prece-
456. Id. at 21.
457. Id.
458. See LOURY, supra note 9, at 21.
459. Id. at 22.
460. The differences between these two principles were first described by the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power Co. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
461. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1993) ("[The Plaintiff has]
the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination." (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981))).
462. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.").
463. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
464. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
465. See United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160-61 (D. Kan. 2004); United States v. Hare, 308 F.
Supp. 2d 955, 963 (D. Neb. 2004); Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ariz. 2005); Peo-
ple v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
466. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
467. Id.
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dent for admission into its academy.468 Cross motions for summary judg-
ment were filed, plaintiffs advancing both statutory and Fifth
Amendment due process grounds for judgment.469 The District Court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that under
the due process argument, there was "no claim of 'an intentional discrimi-
nation or purposeful discriminatory acts' but only a claim that [the test]
bore no relationship to job performance and 'has a highly discriminatory
impact in screening out black candidates.' ,470 The Court of Appeals
took a diametrically opposite view, adopting the statutory scheme of Title
VII permitting a showing of disparate impact, finding the literacy test in-
vidiously discriminated against African-Americans.471 By doing this, the
Court of Appeals effectively incorporated disparate impact theory into
the implied equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.472 The
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that it was guided
by the Supreme Court ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,4 73 that dispa-
rate impact was all that was necessary, and discriminatory intent was ir-
relevant to establish a violation under the Fifth Amendment. 474 The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, taking the opportunity to
clarify the onus required under constitutional allegations of unconstitu-
tional discrimination.475 Disparate impact, absent intent, is a standard of
proof under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not the ultimate
standard for alleged constitutional violations under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.476 Opined the Court:
As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or appli-
cants proceeding under it need not concern themselves with the em-
ployer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely
on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or promo-
tion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. We have never
held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidi-
ous racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.477
Under Title VII, the courts have carved out a narrow statutory excep-
tion to the prevailing rule that intent to discriminate must be proven for
468. Id. at 232-36.
469. Id. at 233-34.
470. Id. at 235.
471. Davis, 426 U.S. at 236-37.
472. Id. at 237.
473. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
474. Davis, 426 U.S. at 236.
475. Id. at 238.
476. Id. at 238-39.
477. Id. at 238-39.
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allegations arising under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 78 Reli-
ance upon either or both of those amendments still requires proof of ani-
mus.4 7 9 In a practical sense, what this means for the conflict between
motivational and social cognition theories of discrimination is that moti-
vational theory prevails.48° A prima facie case of disparate impact, as
important as it is to get one's foot in the courtroom door, is itself insuffi-
cient to prevail, absent proof of a motivation.48' It is necessary to prove
causation.482
How does one go about proving intent? First, solace may be taken in
Justice John Paul Stevens' concurrence in Washington v. Davis:
[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory intent
is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader
of the Court's opinion might assume .... Therefore, although I ac-
cept the statement of the general rule in the Court's opinion, I am
not yet prepared to indicate how that standard should be applied in
the many cases which have formulated the governing standard in dif-
ferent language.483
Second, unless one is prepared to concede irrefutability to social cogni-
tion theory, acceptance of which by definition nullifies motivation, at
least at a conscious level, it stands to reason that in racial profiling cases,
intent may be proven as in any other case requiring animus.4 84 Motiva-
tional theory is not dead simply because an alternative exists. Show of
intent in criminal cases is instructive. Even a defendant refusing to testify
in accordance with her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
is still susceptible to conviction by way of circumstantial evidence of in-
tent.485 Exceptions to the hearsay rule including admissions by party op-
478. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
479. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
480. But cf Krieger, supra note 348, at 1211 ("The assumptions underlying Title VII's
disparate treatment theory have been so substantially undermined by social cognition the-
ory that they can no longer be considered valid.").
481. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1972) (stating that a statistically dis-
proportionate impact by the Social Security Act is insufficient without a showing of intent
to discriminate).
482. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
483. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
484. Indeed, selective enforcement claims always require proof of both discriminatory
impact and discriminatory intent. See United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160-61 (D. Kan. 2004); United States
v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 963 (D. Neb. 2004); Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1274
(Ariz. 2005); People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
485. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563-64 (1983) (holding that the admission
into evidence of circumstantial blood-alcohol test results does not violate a criminal defen-
dant's right against self-incrimination).
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ponents, statements against interest, and excited utterances are all
admissible into evidence, and tend to prove intent, in civil suits by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, in criminal cases beyond a reasonable doubt.4 8 6
Observed Gross and Barnes, "Racial profiling is impossible to detect or
prove without detailed information on police conduct; whom they stop,
question, and search, by race; why they take these actions; and what they
discover in the process." '487 "The essential step," they argue, is that data
be collected and retained "in the first place." '488 This Texas already has
mandated by statute.489 The data exists. Use of the data is the crux of
the matter. Borrowing again from employment discrimination law, a
prima facie case based upon a statistical showing of disparate impact by
race opens the courthouse door.490 The burden then shifts to the oppos-
ing side to show either lack of intent or some racially benign motivation
for disparate treatment.49' Upon such showing, the burden then reverts
to the proponent to show the benign reason is a pretext or sham for dis-
crimination.492 At this point, the finder of fact takes over, deliberates,
then decides.
IV. DATA
The government are very keen on amassing statistics - they collect
them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and
prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every
one of those figures comes in the first instance from the chowty dar
(village watchman), who just puts down what he damn pleases.
Sir Josiah Stamp (Assistant Secretary of
Great Britain's Inland Revenue Department 1916-1919) 49'
Under examination is the Texas Department of Public Safety Highway
Patrol.
The Highway Patrol Service is charged with the responsibility of en-
forcing traffic and criminal laws, investigation of motor vehicle traffic ac-
cidents, and providing a visible police presence in order to deter violators
along more than 223,000 miles of rural highways across the state. The
486. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); FED. R. EVID. 803(2); FED R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
487. Gross & Barnes, supra note 326, at 656.
488. Id.
489. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(b)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
490. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
491. Id.
492. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242-44 (1989).
493. SIR JOSIAH STAMP, SOME ECONOMIc FACTORS IN MODERN LIFE 258-59 (1929),
quoted in Bartleby.com, Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, http://www.bar-
tIeby.comi73/1768.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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Highway Patrol Service currently has an authorized strength of 2091 of-
ficers, including supervisors, and is spread across eighteen highway patrol
districts statewide.4 94
The fact that the Highway Patrol is primarily responsible for a presence
along rural Texas highways, as distinguished from urban byways, may in-
ject a degree of downward bias into the data, if it can be surmised that
minority drivers, especially Blacks, maintain a greater presence in urban,
rather than rural, areas.4 95 If their numbers are not as great as Whites on
rural roads, then minority drivers who get stopped by the Highway Patrol
may suffer from salience. A salient racial minority may be subject to
more vetting than their non-salient White counterparts. This seems
logical.
Data were obtained from the Texas Department of Public Safety under
the Texas Open Records Act.4 96 The entire dataset consists of 5,209,998
citations and warnings (hereinafter called "observations") issued by the
Texas Department of Public Safety for calendar years 2000 (1,026,588 ci-
tations), 2001 (1,031,598 citations), 2002 (988,967 citations), and 2003
(1,094,401 citations and 1,066,493 warnings). With the sole exception of
some redacted citizen identifiers (names and driver's license numbers),
the data are raw, rather than grouped, blocked or aggregated. There are
forty-seven fields, or variables within each observation. With the excep-
tion of "alleged speed," "arrest date," "year," and "date of birth," which
are continuous variables, the remaining variables are either categorical or
nominal. Many variables are dichotomous. For each year's dataset the
forty-seven variables within each observation are:
1) Arrest key
2) Arrest date
3) Year
4) Month
5) Date of birth (DOB)
6) Ticket type
7) Commercial driver's license (binary)
8) Commercial vehicle (binary)
494. TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2005-
2009 33 (2004), available at http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/oai (follow "Strategic Outlook"
hyperlink).
495. Texas Department of Public Safety, Department of Public Safety's Organiza-
tional Structure, http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/overview/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) ("The
Texas Highway Patrol (THP) Division is responsible for general police traffic supervision
and traffic and criminal law enforcement on the rural highways of Texas.").
496. Steven R. Wolfson, Racial Profiling in Texas Department of Public Safety Motor
Vehicle Searches: Race Aware or Race Benign, 2000-2003 (2005) (on file with The
Scholar); see also TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001-552.002 (Vernon 2004).
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9) County (numbered 1 to 254 for each of the 254 Texas counties)
10) Court
11) Day
12) Driver's license by state
13) Hazmat (binary)
14) Interstate (binary)
15) Intrastate (binary)
16) Milepost
17) Service (DPS division)
18) Region
19) District (DPS)
20) Sergeant area
21) Officer ID (by badge number)
22) Precinct
23) Quarter of day
24) Race and sex (aggregated)
25) Road class
26) Route
27) Ticket number
28) License plate
29) License plate by state
30) Vehicle type
31) Accident (binary)
32) Alleged speed
33) Speed limit
34) Construction zone (binary)
35) Workers present (binary)
36) Warning issued (binary)
37) Citation issued (binary)
38) Search (binary, whether one was conducted or not)
39) Probable cause (binary, whether any was extant)
40) Consent for search (binary, whether any was extant)
41) Search incident to arrest (binary)
42) Vehicle inventory (binary)
43) Contraband found (binary)
44) Drugs found (binary)
45) Weapon found (binary)
46) Currency found (binary)
47) Other contraband found (binary).
To get an intuitive feel for the data, a number of diagnostic tests first
were performed. For the race and sex variable in 2000, 436 dubious ob-
servations were discovered. Although 436 observations out of 1,026,588
total is infinitesimal, the 436 observations were inspected to assure that
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no endemic contamination was extant. It was concluded that these errors
were the result of data entry error by DPS technicians, so they were
dropped. The next three years proved to be considerably cleaner than
year 2000 for race/sex, in that only one questionable observation out of
1,031,598 was found in 2001; and none were found in 2002, thereby obvi-
ating the need for dropping any observations in those years. The 2003
data were the cleanest and best managed as received from the DPS, with
no dubious observations detected.
The race and sex variable was parsed, then quantified as binary vari-
ables each for male and female, and for each racial group. There are six
racial groups: Asian, Black, Hispanic, Indian (Native American), White,
and Unknown. To isolate drivers with Texas driver's licenses from those
with out-of-state licenses, binary variables were generated, so that any
driver's license from a state other than Texas was equal to one, and a
Texas license was equal to zero. From the date of birth variable, a new
variable called "age" was created, which was a continuous variable from
the driver's date of birth to the date a citation was issued (for warnings
where no citation was issued, the dataset contains no date of birth, so the
"age" variable could not be generated for warnings); and from birth date,
a binary variable equal to one was generated for drivers under thirty
years of age. Interaction terms for racial groups driving with out-of state
driver's licenses were generated. Other interactions that seemed useful -
Black/Hispanic under thirty years old, male under thirty years old, and
Black/Hispanic male - were generated.
Driver population data were obtained from the United States Census
Bureau for the year 2000, the most recent census, specifically Summary
File 3 (SF3), Texas, PCT55, Means of Transportation to Work for Work-
ers 16 Years and Over.4 97 As explained below, these data served as a
proxy variable for number of miles driven by race traveling on Texas
highways.
The dependent (effect) variable for all regressions was "search" or
"contraband." The dependent variables are binary - one for existence of
a search or contraband given a search, zero for nonexistence. Indepen-
dent (cause) variables are a column vector of variables, such as race
(Black, White, or Hispanic) and any other variables that logically seem to
have a causal effect upon the occurrence of a search or contraband.
In any serious study of racial profiling, it is first necessary to establish a
benchmark against which to judge disparate impact upon a group. Grog-
497. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000, SUMMARY FILE 3, http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2006).
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ger and Ridgeway498 cite this as a "key empirical problem." '499
Benchmarks used in this study are as follows:
(1) for traffic stops - Texas population-at-large and population of
drivers in Texas, derived from the United States Census Bureau,
2000 Census, Summary Files (SF) 3, Table P7 (Texas Population) and
SF4, Table PCT 55 (Texas Drivers);
(2) for searches - the sample of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics
stopped and searched by DPS, taken from the DPS dataset; and
(3) for contraband - the sample of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics on
whom contraband was found, given a search, taken from the DPS
dataset.
Since the population of Texas drivers consists of all Texas drivers, the
DPS data should be considered to be a sample of the entire Texas driving
population that is or may be subject to stop and search anytime while
driving on Texas highways.
In 2000, out of 1,026,587 total stops on Texas roadways, DPS conducted
36,408 searches. Of those stopped, 70.7 percent were White; 9.56 percent
were Black; and 18 percent were Hispanic. The remaining races were
Asian, Native American Indian, and Unknown, none of which have been
examined for purposes of this study.
Of the 36,408 searches in 2000, 21,103 or 57.96 percent of all searches
were of Whites; 5,030 or 13.82 percent of all searches were of Blacks; and
9,873 or 27.12 percent of all searches were of Hispanics. A major discrep-
ancy became evident when it was attempted to determine how many of
the 36,408 tabulated aggregate searches in 2000 were the result of con-
sent, probable cause, search incident to arrest, or inventory search. Since
these are the only categories of search in the database, indeed the only
type of police searches legally permissible, each search must fit into one
of these specific categories. Thus, the total number of searches should
approximate the total number of searches comprised by each legal
category.
But in 2000, breaking down the frequency of searches by each of these
separate categories yielded the following frequencies: consent-5; proba-
ble cause-3; incident to arrest-2; inventory-5; for a total of 15 searches
by legal category, even though the data reflected 36,408 aggregate
searches. This difference between 36,408 and 15 means that legal justifi-
cation in the data for 36,393 searches is inexplicable, although highly sig-
nificant. The reason for this vast discrepancy is unknown; but it could be
surmised that since this was the first year of data collection, the troopers
498. Grogger & Ridgeway, supra note 39.
499. Id. at 1.
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were not yet sufficiently trained in how to record the data; or maybe they
were recording Terry-type frisks (pat-downs) as searches, for which there
is no corresponding field in the database. 500 Another reason might be
technician input error. Whatever the reason, 36,393 searches without le-
gal justification is too significant to ignore. Because this may reflect a
major source of bias or contamination within the dataset, it was decided
not to emphasize these data for calendar year 2000.
In 2001, there were 1,031,598 stops and 49,309 tabulated aggregate
searches. Whites comprised 65.65 percent of total stops; Blacks - 9.44
percent; and Hispanics - 22.94 percent. Whites were searched 28,746
times, or 58.3 percent of the total searches; Blacks were 6417 of the total
searches, or 13.01 percent of total searches; and Hispanics were 13,602
searches, or 27.59 percent of total searches. The same discrepancy with
the search categories found in 2000 also appeared in 2001. Consent re-
flects 100 cases; probable cause - 55; incident to arrest - 90; and inven-
tory - 141; for a total of 386 compared to 49,309 tabulated aggregate
searches. As in year 2000, in 2001, there are 48,923 searches without re-
corded legal justification. This is 12,500 more questionable searches than
in the previous year. Inevitably, the conclusion is that either the data, or
the method of data entry, is unreliable. Since the search data for 2001 are
contaminated or biased, it was decided not to emphasize data for that
year.
In 2002, there were 988,967 stops, resulting in 72,099 searches. Whites
comprised 63.55 percent of all stops; Blacks - 9.66 percent; and Hispanics
- 24.77 percent. Whites were 54.36 percent of the total searches; Blacks -
13.07 percent of total searches; and Hispanics - 31.46 percent of total
searches. For this year, the reason for search fields approximately coin-
cided with the total number of searches: consent - 26,327; probable cause
- 13,434; incident to arrest - 17,014; and inventory - 17,104; for a total of
73,879, compared to the tabulated aggregate searches being 72,099. Ac-
counting for rounding and data entry error, this seems close enough for
valid statistical and regression analyses.
For 2003, DPS technicians created two separate files - one for citations,
and another for warnings in which no citation was issued. Searches were
conducted concomitant with some warnings, even though no citation was
issued. Both files were examined separately. Variables of interest in the
2003 warning file are:
Search
500. In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court created an exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement allowing an officer to "pat down" or
"stop-and-frisk" a suspect that the officer reasonably believes is engaged in criminal activi-
ties. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
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Contraband
Black
White
Hispanic
Out of State Black
Out of State White
Out of State Hispanic
The date of birth variable was not included, because when a warning,
rather than a citation, is issued, no driver age is recorded. Thus, there
were no observations for date of birth in the warning file.
For 2003, stops resulting in a citation totaled 1,096,352, resulting in
99,095 searches. Of all stops, Whites comprised 63.85 percent; Blacks -
9.4 percent; and Hispanics - 24.87 percent. The rest of the stops were of
Indian, Asian, or Unknown race. Search rates were: 45.97 percent of all
searches were of Whites; 9.86 percent of all searches were of Blacks; and
43.41 percent of all searches were of Hispanics; the remainder being In-
dian, Asian, or Unknown. Total for probable cause searches was 15,518;
consent - 28,946; incident to arrest - 17,612; and vehicle inventory -
19,475; for a grand total by discrete category of 81,551, compared to the
99,095 aggregate searches, for a difference of 17,544, or a discrepancy of
5.65 percent of the total. Once again, reasons for the discrepancy are
unknown, but it was decided this was close enough to use this file.
In the warning file, there were 1,066,493 stops without a citation being
issued. This does not mean, however, that there were no searches. To the
contrary, there were many. Of the total stops, Blacks comprised 8.92 per-
cent; Whites comprised 69.32 percent; and Hispanics comprised 20.28
percent. There were 14,595 searches of which Blacks comprised 15.42
percent of total searches, Whites comprised 40.54 percent, and Hispanics
comprised 42.70 percent. The frequency of searches by legal category
was: consent - 12,865; probable cause - 1,255; incident to arrest - 319;
and vehicle inventory - 196; for a total of 14,635, compared to 14,595 by
tabulating the total, less than 0.05 percent discrepancy, an extremely close
match, and most useful for statistical and regression analyses.
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics."
Benjamin Disraeli, as given notoriety by Mark Twain5" 1
501. MARK TWAIN, THE AurOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN 149 (Charles Neider ed.,
Harper & Brothers 1959) (1917).
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For want of a better definition, statistical profiling is what Knowles,
Perisco, and Todd would call "statistical" discrimination, meaning that
according to the numbers certain racial or ethnic groups suffer a dispro-
portionately higher rate of vetting by law enforcement than their counter-
parts; but actual animus toward them cannot be proved.50 2 Any pattern,
if one exists, would be analogous to disparate impact in employment dis-
crimination, where it is the effect rather than the cause which is impor-
tant.5°3 Regardless of the absence of animus, if protected classes are
relegated to subservient status, remediation is necessary.50 4 Racially be-
nign practices may yet produce disparate impact upon these classes. 50 5
This differs from disparate treatment where proof of animus is a prereq-
uisite to remedy.50 6 Statistical profiling may exist de facto, even though
racial profiling is prohibited de jure. Patterns of statistical profiling, how-
ever, can be discerned from the data.
To begin a statistical analysis of racial profiling, it is first necessary to
test certain hypotheses about the environment under examination. In an
ideal law enforcement environment, but for racial discrimination, all else
being equal, one would not expect African-Americans or Hispanics to
bear a statistically significant higher stop or search rate than their white
counterparts. On average, the rates among races should be approxi-
mately equal. If it is hypothesized that racial profiling does not exist,
then race qua race should not be a statistically significant variable in law
enforcement decisions. If Blacks and Hispanics are being stopped and
searched more than Whites, then their hit rates should be greater than for
Whites. However, if they are being stopped and searched more, but their
hit rates are equal to or lower than for Whites, evidence of statistical
profiling, or even outright disparate treatment, may exist. These are the
hypotheses to be tested. Expressed symbolically in logical sequence, they
are:
(1) H01 :P blacks stopped P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial profil-
ing does not exist, then the proportion of Blacks stopped will be less
than or equal to the proportion of Whites stopped.
(2) Hal :P blacks stopped > P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial profil-
ing does exist, then the proportion of Blacks stopped will be greater
than the proportion of Whites stopped.
502. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 109, at 205.
503. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
504. Id. at 239.
505. Id. at 238-39.
506. Id. at 240-41.
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(3) H02 :P Hispanics stopped !5 P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial
profiling does not exist, then the proportion of Hispanics stopped
will be less than or equal to the proportion of Whites stopped.
(4) Ha2 :P Hispanics stopped > P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial
profiling does exist, then the proportion of Hispanics stopped will be
greater than the proportion of Whites stopped.
(5) H 0 3 :P blacks searched P whites searched All else being equal, if racial pro-
filing does not exist, then the proportion of Blacks searched will be
less than or equal to the proportion of Whites searched.
(6) H3 :P blacks searched > 'P whites searched All else being equal, if racial pro-
filing does exist, then the proportion of Blacks searched will be
greater than the proportion of Whites searched.
(7) H04 :P Hispanics searched P whites searched All else being equal, if racial
profiling does not exist, then the proportion of Hispanics searched
will be less than or equal to the proportion of Whites searched.
(8) Ha4 :P Hispanics searched > P whites searched All else being equal, if racial
profiling does exist, then the proportion of Hispanics searched will
be greater than the proportion of Whites searched.
(9) H05 :P contraband on blacks P contraband on whites All else being equal, if
racial profiling does not exist, then given a search, the proportion of
finding contraband on Blacks will be greater than or equal to the
proportion of finding contraband on Whites.
(10) Ha5 :P contraband on blacks < P contraband on whites All else being equal, if
racial profiling does exist, then given a search, the proportion of find-
ing contraband on Blacks will be less than the proportion of finding
contraband on Whites.
(11) 16 :P contraband on Hispanics -- P contraband on whites All else being equal, if
racial profiling does not exist, then given a search, the proportion of
finding contraband on Hispanics will be greater than or equal to the
proportion of finding contraband on Whites.
(12) Ha6 :P contraband on Hispanics < P contraband on whites All else being equal, if
racial profiling does exist, then given a search, the proportion of find-
ing contraband on Hispanics will be less than the proportion of find-
ing contraband on Whites.
To test for statistical significance of racial profiling, or racial disparities
to be more exact, in search and hit rates, three quantitative methods have
been employed. First is a simple cross tabulation comparison of searches
and discovery of contraband by race. Percentages of search and hit rates
for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics are tabulated, and then compared to
each other. Whites searched are tabulated versus Whites stopped, Blacks
searched are tabulated versus Blacks stopped, and Hispanics searched are
tabulated versus Hispanics stopped. The same methodology is employed
for discovery of contraband in the event of a search, by each racial group.
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Second, a statistical difference of binary proportions test is performed
to test the foregoing hypotheses at a statistically significant (alpha) level.
Third and last, logit models are performed to test for the odds of being
searched or contraband being discovered by DPS, if one is of a particular
race/ethnicity (Black/Hispanic), while holding other non-racial variables
constant. Explanatory variables held constant are age, sex, out-of-state
drivers license, and certain interaction terms.
Some caveats are in order. First, the present methodology (indeed all
statistical methodologies) is constrained by the dataset. As a practical
matter, what this means is that the decision to search is admittedly based
upon more, perhaps many more, variables than are patently available.
No dataset can possibly account for all explanatory variables, some of
which in part end up in the so-called "error" term of the equation.5 °7
Some of these error terms, however, are susceptible to quantification,
thus allowing placement into the quantifiable independent variable ma-
trix. For the present, however, it should be noted that the logit regres-
sions do not, and cannot, account for all possible explanatory variables
for predicting the odds of being searched or contraband being discovered.
But they do control for as many of the relevant variables as are present in
the dataset, including some additional ones created by interacting the
available variables. Relevant variables include race and sex, young
(under 30 years old), and interaction terms, such as Black male, Hispanic
male, young Black, and young Hispanic.
At least two more caveats are in order. In the logit model, since every
subject in the dataset has been stopped, using "stop" as a dependent vari-
able would result in perfect identification, since for every observation
there would be a one hundred percent chance of success (a stop). In
logit, this would yield a beta of negative infinity for each independent
variable, with a standard error of infinity, obviously rendering any results
useless. Finally, other things being equal, the odds of being stopped by
DPS are directly proportional to the number of miles driven on roads
patrolled by the DPS. It is axiomatic that the more one drives on Texas
highways, the more likely one is to be stopped by DPS, and vice versa.
Since neither the DPS, nor the state of Texas or the United States Census
Bureau, collect data on number of miles driven in a state by race, a proxy
variable must be used to estimate this figure. The proxy generated was
based upon the closest correlation that could be found to the number of
miles driven by racial group on Texas highways. These data came from
Summary File 3 (SF 3) of the 2000 United States Census Bureau Sample
Data; Table PCT55, "Means of Transportation to Work for Workers 16
Years and Over."
507. See GUJARATI, supra note 144, at 5.
[Vol. 8:117
RACIAL PROFILING
The Census Bureau defines "means of transportation to work" as:
derived from answers to long-form questionnaire Item 23a, which
was asked of a sample of the population 15 years old and over. This
question was asked of people who indicated in Question 21 that they
worked at some time during the reference week .... Means of trans-
portation to work refers to the principal mode of travel or type of
conveyance that the worker usually used to get from home to work
during the reference week. Data were tabulated for workers 16
years old and over; that is, members of the armed forces and civilians
who were at work during the reference week.5 °8
These data are blocked by the Census Bureau by race for "White
alone," "Black or African-American alone," and "Hispanic or Latino (of
any race)". By racial/ethnic group, the Census data reflect:
Car, truck, or van
Drove alone or carpooled
Public transportation
Bus or trolley bus
Streetcar or trolley car
Subway or elevated
Ferryboat
Taxicab
Motorcycle
Bicycle
Walked
Other
From these data, the variable selected as a proxy for miles driven was -
by racial or ethnic group - car, truck, or van, without blocking for driving
alone or carpooling. In other words, the proxy variable includes vehicles
-car, truck, or van - with one or more occupants.
In the logit model, to determine the probability of occurrence of an
event, or a so-called "success," 1 represents "success" and 0 represents
"not a success." "Success" is non-normative, implying nothing good or
bad, simply the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event in interest, i.e.,
a search or discovery of contraband. Again, an event of interest does not
include "stop," due to the perfect identification problem.
This study relies upon quantitative methods adopted from Ross and
Yinger, discussed earlier. A binary logit model is used to determine the
508. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUMMARY FILE 4, SUBJECT CHARACTERISTIC: JOURNEY
TO WORK, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/SF4.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2006).
20061
THE SCHOLAR
probability of being searched if one is Black or Hispanic, compared to
White. To corroborate this model, actual search rates of Blacks and His-
panics, compared to Whites, are tabulated.
The search rate is the percentage of search for a particular group, given
the number of members of that group who have been stopped. Ex-
pressed mathematically:
# members of group searched
# members of group stopped
Then the hit rate (actually finding contraband) is calculated for Black,
Hispanic, and White. Expressed mathematically:
# times contraband discoveredHit rate =
# members of group searched
For example, the hit rate for Whites would be number of times contra-
band was discovered on Whites searched. These hit rates then may be
compared across groups to each other.
The first dependent variable is "search," more precisely searched given
a stop, but for brevity it is denominated "search." The second dependent
variable is "contraband" (discovery of) given a search.
Since the dependent variables are binary (0 or 1), logit is an appropri-
ate model by which to measure the success rate of the event in interest. It
is preferable to the linear probability model, which among other infirmi-
ties may suffer from absurd predictions of negative dependent variable
values or values greater than one, and is the wrong functional form (in-
cremental coefficient changes may incorrectly appear as linear or con-
stant, as opposed to curvilinear - such as diminishing marginal effects).5 °9
In logit, the odds are expressed as
Pi
1-Pi
The logit model itself is expressed as
1= in __
or the natural log odds of an event occurring.51 0 Logit employs a likeli-
hood ratio statistic, which approximates a chi-squared (-2) distribution."'
509. J. ScoTr LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPEN-
DENT VARIABLES 133-35 (1997).
510. See GUJARATI, supra note 144, at 554-63.
511. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 882-86 (Leah Jewell et al., eds.,
3rd ed. 1997).
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In this study, logit is used to estimate the odds of a search or discovery of
contraband given a search if a person is of a particular race or ethnicity.
A. Statewide Cross- Tabulation Comparisons of Searches
1. 2002
In 2002, DPS stopped 95,460 African-Americans, and searched 9,415,
or 9.87 percent; 244,177 Hispanics and searched 22,573, or 9.24 percent;
and 627,578 Whites and searched 39,117 or 6.23 percent. These figures
compare to Blacks comprising 10 percent; Hispanics 26 percent; and
Whites 60 percent, respectively, of the population of Texas drivers, ac-
cording to the 2000 United States Census. As the Figure 4.1 illustrates,
Whites comprised 6.23 percent of the total searches that year, African-
Americans - 9.87 percent; and Hispanics - 9.26 percent. Table 4.1 re-
flects search rates by race for the year 2002.
12
Hispanic, 9.26
WhiteA 91
El Search Rates by Race, 2002
Black White Hispanic
FIGURE 4.1 SEARCH RATES BY RACE, 2002
2. 2003
In 2003, from a combined dataset of warnings and citations, DPS
stopped 198,128 African-Americans, and searched 12,024 or 6.07 percent
of them; 488,936 Hispanics, resulting in 49,254 searches, or 10.07 percent;
and 1,439,348 Whites, resulting in 51,467 searches, or 3.58 percent. This
compares to Blacks comprising 10 percent, Hispanics 26 percent, and
2006]
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Whites 60 percent, respectively, of the population of Texas drivers. Fig-
ure 4.2 reflects search rates by race for 2003.
12
Black, 6.07
Blaok
M Search Rates by Race, 2003
White, 3.58
HispanicWhite
FIGURE 4.2 SEARCH RATES BY RACE, 2003
B. Statewide Cross- Tabulation Comparisons of Hit Rates
In order for these higher search rates on African-Americans and His-
panics to reflect good police practices rather than racial harassment, the
hit rates should be higher for African-Americans and Hispanics than for
Whites. It should be cautioned, however, that recording discovery of con-
traband in the present database is not tantamount to forensic evidence of,
or a final conviction for possessing, contraband. It is only the trooper's
perception of the existence of contraband, and his or her recording as
such on the citation or warning. Cocaine may in fact ultimately turn out
to be pulverized billiard chalk, but this ultimate determination is not re-
flected in the dataset. Thus, a positive hit recorded in the database
should not be construed as actual possession of contraband or a convic-
tion. It is simply the best data available.
1. 2002
Figure 4.3 compares the statewide search rates to hit rates by Black,
White, and Hispanic. As reflected in Figure 4.3, Whites had a search rate
of 6.23 percent to a hit rate of 40.11 percent; Blacks had a search rate of
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FIGURE 4.3 2002 SEARCH AND CONTRABAND RATES, BY RACE
9.87 percent to a hit rate of 41.89 percent; and Hispanics had a search rate
of 9.26 percent to a hit rate of 23.9 percent.
2. 2003
Figure 4.4 illustrates the same thing as Figure 4.3, except for 2003.
Whites had a search rate of 3.58 percent, compared to a hit rate of 34.49
percent; Blacks had a search rate of 6.07 percent, compared to a hit rate
of 35.30 percent; and Hispanics had a search rate of 10.07 percent com-
pared to a hit rate of 12.54 percent.
C. Summary Interpretation of Search and Hit Rates
1. 2002
By a narrow margin, Blacks had the highest search rate by race; His-
panics were a close second; and Whites had the lowest search rate by race
of all three groups. But the rates reflect disporportionality between
searches and hit rates. Blacks were searched about 58 percent (1.582)
more than Whites, but had about an equal hit rate (41.89 versus 40.11).
Hispanics were searched almost fifty percent more than Whites (1.484),
but had a hit rate only 60 percent (.596) that of Whites. Whites had the
lowest percent search rate by a fairly wide margin - about one-third less -
than either Blacks or Hispanics, but had a hit rate about equal to Blacks,
and about 40 percent higher than Hispanics.
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FIGURE 4.4 2003 SEARCH AND CONTRABAND RATES, BY RACE
2. 2003
This year, Hispanics had the highest search rate by race by a considera-
ble margin - almost three times (2.8 times) that of Whites, and about two-
thirds higher than that of Blacks. But the Hispanic hit rate fell by about
one-half from the previous year - from 23.9 to 12.54, the lowest hit rate
for all three groups. Their search rate, however, was eight percent higher
than from the previous year. For the second year, Blacks and Whites had
essentially equal hit rates - 35.3 to 34.49, respectively - although the
search rate for Blacks was about 70 percent higher for Blacks than for
Whites.
D. Summary Results for 2002 and 2003
For both years, Hispanics have much higher search rates by race than
either Blacks or Whites, but much lower hit rates for both years. Blacks
have higher search rates than Whites, but a hit rate for all practical pur-
poses equal to Whites, again for both years.
What these results reflect is law enforcement inefficiency. A pattern
emerges that Hispanics are being targeted more often than their White
and Black counterparts, despite the fact that they are discovered possess-
ing contraband less often than either. From the data, it may be inferred
that both Blacks and Hispanics are targeted more often for search than
their White counterparts, even though hit rates for Blacks are essentially
equal, and for Hispanics lower, than for Whites. In terms of economic
efficiency of allocating scarce law enforcement resources to areas of the
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greatest need, this would be indicative of inefficiency. If one were to de-
sire to restore equilibrium to the forces of supply and demand imposed
upon law enforcement, resources would be more efficiently allocated by
targeting Hispanics and Blacks less, and Whites more. Economics aside,
in the context of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of law,
the rates indeed reflect racial disparities.
E. Racial Disparities in Search Rates by DPS Region
Geographically, the Texas Department of Public Safety is divided into
regions and districts. Prior to September 1, 2003, there were seven re-
gions; subsequent to a reorganization effective that date, the number of
regions was increased to eight. Both before and after September 1, 2003,
region seven was the State Capitol grounds, the building, not the City of
Austin. What follows as Figures 4.5 and 4.6 are search rates by race by
DPS region for years 2002 and 2003. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 are pre and post
reorganization maps of the DPS regions and districts. As is evident from
the figures, Blacks are searched at a higher rate than Whites, but Hispan-
ics are searched at higher rates than either Blacks or Whites by region,
continuing the pattern evident from the cross tabulations.
F. Consensual Searches
A hypothesis attempting to explain the disparities in search rates be-
tween Hispanics and Blacks and Whites is that Hispanics, some of whom
may be less fluent in English than Blacks or Whites, may be more subject
to consensual search, due to intimidation of the language barrier. While
it is possible with the present dataset to discern numbers and percentages
of consensual searches by race, limitations exists by dint of the data not
reflecting whether a subject was in fact asked for consent to search. Thus,
it is possible that Hispanics were asked less often to consent than the
other groups. As is evident from Figure 4.9, consensual searches per-
formed on Hispanics were less than those performed on Blacks or Whites
for both years. But nothing here reflects whether Blacks and Whites
were asked for consent more or less often than Hispanics. All that can be
gleaned is that the majority of consensual searches were performed on
Blacks, then Whites, and least on Hispanics. So problematic are consen-
sual searches that they have been criticized in a study prepared for the
Texas Criminal Justice Coalition (TCJC), the American Civil Liberties
Union of Texas (ACLU), the League of Latin American Citizens of Texas
(LULAC), and the Texas State Conference of NAACP Branches
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(NAACP). Among other things, this study recommends banning consen-
sual searches.51 2
G. Difference of Binomial Proportions Tests
While it would be helpful to compare rates of stops by race statewide
to numbers of miles driven by race on roads patrolled by DPS, a major
problem is that data on miles driven by race are not collected by the U.S.
Census or the State of Texas. Therefore, a proxy variable in lieu of miles
driven on Texas roads by race must be created. The chosen proxy is
means of transportation to work, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
The rationale is transportation upon public roads by privately owned ve-
hicle by race was the closest variable to miles driven by race that could be
gleaned from existing data. According to the 2000 United States Census,
Texas has a total population of 20,851,820 people. Of the total Texas pop-
ulation, Whites comprise 71 percent (14.8 million), Blacks or African-
Americans - 11.5 percent (2.4 million), and Hispanics (defined as an
ethnicity, not a race) of any race - 32 percent (6.7 million).
According to a sample taken by the Census Bureau, in the year 2000, 8,
441,602 Texans used a private vehicle to commute to work.513 "Private
vehicle occupancy refers to the number of people who usually rode to
512. See STEWARD & TOTMAN, supra note 2.
513. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: JOURNEY To WORK 2000 9 (2004).
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work in the vehicle during the reference week. '514 "Drove alone" in-
cludes people who drove to work alone, as well as those who were
dropped off at work by someone else.515 "Carpooled" means two or
more people commuting to work in a single vehicle during the week.51 6
Of this total, 78.8 percent of Whites drove alone, 65.9 percent of African-
Americans drove alone, and 83.2 percent of Hispanics or Latinos (of any
race) drove to work in a car, truck, or van, either alone or in a carpool.517
Percentages of the total Texas population that drove privately owned ve-
hicles to work are as follows:
White alone: 6.3 million/9.16 million = .69 or 69 percent
Black or African-American alone: 0.84 million/9.16 million = .09 or 9
percent
Hispanic or Latino (of any race): 2.2 million/9.16 million = .24 or 24
percent
Since the data do not reflect number of miles driven by race, from the
proxy it may be inferred that mileage rates by race would be similar to
the foregoing percentages. Indeed, in that the vehicle commuting rates
are not out of line with the proportional racial composition of the entire
state, such an inference does not seem outlandish.
Tables 4.1 through 4.5 reflect percentages of DPS traffic stops of Texas
drivers by race for White, Black, and Hispanic for the years 2000 through
2003. These percentages are used to test for z scores of statistical signifi-
cance in differences of binomial proportions of stops by race. Using a
normal distribution (z) table at a .05 level of significance for a one tailed
test, the decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in
proportions based upon race if z scores are greater than 1.645, or less
than -1.645, depending on whether it is a lower (left) tail or upper (right)
tail test of significance.
Applying this test, a comparison is made between the proportions of
Black motorists to White motorists stopped, and Hispanic motorists to
White motorists stopped on Texas roads by the Highway Patrol.
514. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, USING THE DATA: SUBJECT DEFINITIONS, http://www.cen-
sus.gov/acs/UseData/Def/J_towork.htm.
515. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2002 SUBJECT DEFINI-
TIONS 54 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/2002/usedata/Sub-
ject Definitions.pdf.
516. Id.
517. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 513, at 4.
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TABLE 4.1
TEXAS POPULATION, DRIVERS, AND TRAFFIC STOPS 2000
Population % Population Drivers % Drivers Stops % Stops
Total 20851820 8441602 1026588
White 10927538 52% 5030913 60% 725750 71%
Black 2349641 11% 826761 10% 98192 10%
Hispanic 6670122 32% 2209402 26% 184594 18%
Drivers as % of Stops as % of
Pop. By Race Pop. By Race Stops as % of Drivers by Race
Total 40% 5% 12%
White 46% 7% 14%
Black 35% 4% 12%
Hispanic 33% 3% 8%
1. For race, "White" and "Black" refer to non-Hispanic persons of a single race.
2. Drivers include all persons 16 years and over who commute to work by car, truck, or
van.
3. Percentages are rounded.
Sources:
Texas Population: 2000 U.S. Census, SF3, Table P7
Drivers: 2000 U.S. Census, SF4, Table PCT55
Stops: DPS traffic stops file for 2000
TABLE 4.2
TEXAS POPULATION, DRIVERS, AND TRAFFIC STOPS 2001
Population % Population Drivers % Drivers Stops % Stops
Total 20851820 8441602 1031598
White 10927538 52% 5030913 60% 677194 66%
Black 2349641 11% 826761 10% 97353 9%
Hispanic 6670122 32% 2209402 26% 236672 23%
Drivers as % of Stops as % of
Pop. By Race Pop. By Race Stops as % of Drivers by Race
Total 40% 5% 12%
White 46% 6% 13%
Black 35% 4% 12%
Hispanic 33% 4% 11%
1. For race, "White" and "Black" refer to non-Hispanic persons of a single race.
2. Drivers include all persons 16 years and over who commute to work by car, truck, or
van.
3. Percentages are rounded.
Sources:
Texas Population: 2000 U.S. Census, SF3, Table P7
Drivers: 2000 U.S. Census, SF4, Table PCT55
Stops: DPS traffic stops file for 2001
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TABLE 4.3
TEXAS POPULATION, DRIVERS, AND TRAFFIC STOPS 2002
Population % Population Drivers % Drivers Stops % Stops
Total 20851820 8441602 988967
White 10927538 52% 5030913 60% 628452 64%
Black 2349641 11% 826761 10% 95538 10%
Hispanic 6670122 32% 2209402 26% 244972 25%
Drivers as % of Stops as % of
Pop. By Race Pop. By Race Stops as % of Drivers by Race
Total 40% 5% 12%
White 46% 6% 12%
Black 35% 4% 12%
Hispanic 33% 4% 11%
1. For race, "White" and "Black" refer to non-Hispanic persons of a single race. rule
2. Drivers include all persons 16 years and over who commute to work by car, truck, or
van.
3. Percentages are rounded.
Sources:
Texas Population: 2000 U.S. Census, SF3, Table P7
Drivers: 2000 U.S. Census, SF4, Table PCT55
Stops: DPS traffic stops file for 2002
TABLE 4.4
TEXAS POPULATION, DRIVERS, AND TRAFFIC STOPS 2003 CITATIONS
Population % Population Drivers % Drivers Stops % Stops
Total 20851820 8441602 1094401
White 10927538 52% 5030913 60% 699037 64%
Black 2349641 11% 826761 10% 102945 9%
Hispanic 6670122 32% 2209402 26% 271752 25%
Drivers as % of Stops as % of
Pop. By Race Pop. By Race Stops as % of Drivers by Race
Total 40% 5% 13%
White 46% 6% 14%
Black 35% 4% 13%
Hispanic 33% 4% 12%
1. For race, "White" and "Black" refer to non-Hispanic persons of a single race.
2. Drivers include all persons 16 years and over who commute to work by car,
truck, or van.
3. Percentages are rounded.
Sources:
Texas Population: 2000 U.S. Census, SF3, Table P7
Drivers: 2000 U.S. Census, SF4, Table PCT55
Stops: DPS Citations file for 2003
2006]
TABLE 4.5
TEXAS POPULATION, DRIVERS, AND TRAFFIC STOPS 2003 WARNINGS
Population % Population Drivers % Drivers Stops % Stops
Total 20851820 8441602 1066493
White 10927538 52% 5030913 60% 739321 67%
Black 2349641 11% 826761 10% 95119 9%
Hispanic 6670122 32% 2209402 26% 216315 20%
Drivers as % of Stops as % of
Pop. By Race Pop. By Race Stops as % of Drivers by Race
Total 40% 5% 13%
White 46% 7% 15%
Black 35% 4% 12%
Hispanic 33% 3% 10%
1. For race, "White" and "Black" refer to non-Hispanic persons of a single race.
2. Drivers include all persons 16 years and over who commute to work by car, truck, or
van.
3. Percentages are rounded.
Sources:
Texas Population: 2000 U.S. Census, SF3, Table P7
Drivers: 2000 U.S. Census, SF4, Table PCT55
Stops: DPS Warnings file for 2003
H. Hypotheses Numbers One and Two (Restated):
H01 P blacks stopped P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial profiling
does not exist, then the proportion of Blacks stopped will be less
than or equal to the proportion of Whites stopped.
Hal :P blacks stopped > P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial profiling
does exist, then the proportion of Blacks stopped will be greater than
the proportion of Whites stopped.
H 02 -PHispanics stopped -- P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial profil-
ing does not exist, then the proportion of Hispanics stopped will be
less than or equal to the proportion of Whites stopped.
Ha2 P Hispanics stopped > P whites stopped All else being equal, if racial profil-
ing does exist, then the proportion of Hispanics stopped will be
greater than the proportion of Whites stopped.
Decision rule is to reject the null if Z > 1.645.
For year 2000:
Proportion of Blacks to Whites stopped:
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(0.119-0.144)Z01 = -21.13 Do not reject null.
(0.141*0.859) 9+7198,192 725,750
Proportion of Hispanics to Whites stopped:
(0.084-0.144)
Z = = -68.04 Do not reject null.
(0.126*0.874) +184,594 725,750
For year 2001:
Proportion of Blacks to Whites stopped:
(0.118-0.135)
Z = = -14.61 Do not reject null.
(0.132*0.868) 9 74S97,353 677,194
Proportion of Hispanics to Whites stopped:
(0.107-0.135)
Z = = -35.13 Do not reject null.
(0.126*0.874) 2 6236,672 677,194
For year 2002:
Proportion of Blacks to Whites stopped:
(0.116-0.125)
Z = = -7.87 Do not reject null.
(0.124*0.876) +195,538 628,452
Proportion of Hispanics to Whites stopped:
(0.111-0.125)
Z = = -18.02 Do not reject null.
(0.121*0.879) 28244,972 628,452
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For year 2003 Citations:
Proportion of Blacks to Whites stopped:
(0.125-0.139)
Z= -12.19 Do not reject null.
(0.137*0.863) [102,945 699,037
Proportion of Hispanics to Whites stopped:
(0.123-0.139)
Z= -20.74 Do not reject null.
(0.134*0.866) +271,752 699,037
For year 2003 Warnings:
Proportion of Blacks to Whites stopped:
(0.115-0.147)
Z= -26.51 Do not reject null.
(0.142*0.858) [ 795,119 739,321
Proportion of Hispanics to Whites stopped:
(0.098-0.147)
Z= -59.49 Do not reject null.
S(0.132*0.868) [2635+73,2S216,315 739,321
VI. CONCLUSION AS TO PROPORTIONALITY OF STOPS BY
MILE BY RACE:
For none of the years for all three races do the z scores exceed the
critical value of 1.645. The null hypothesis of no statistically significant
difference in proportions of stops by race is not rejected. For all four
years, Blacks and Hispanics were not stopped at disproportionately
higher rates than their White counterparts, all else other than race, being
equal. Nevertheless, a certain measure of caution should be exercised in
light of the possible downward bias in consideration of the primary rural
responsibility of the Highway Patrol.
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A. Hypotheses Numbers Three and Four (Restated):
H 03 :P blacks searched ! P whites searched All else being equal, if racial profiling
does not exist, then the proportion of Blacks searched will be less
than or equal to the proportion of Whites searched.
Ha3 :P blacks searched > P whites searched All else being equal, if racial profiling
does exist, then the proportion of Blacks searched will be greater
than the proportion of Whites searched.
H 04 :P Hispanics searched P whites searched All else being equal, if racial profil-
ing does not exist, then the proportion of Hispanics searched will be
less than or equal to the proportion of Whites searched.
Ha4 :P Hispanics searched > P whites searched All else being equal, if racial profil-
ing does exist, then the proportion of Hispanics searched will be
greater than the proportion of Whites searched.
To test these hypotheses, first, search rates have been determined by
taking the ratio of suspects searched to those stopped, by race, then per-
forming difference of proportions testing for search of Blacks versus
Whites, and Hispanics versus Whites. Search rates were blocked by each
racial group, i.e., Whites searched to Whites stopped, Blacks searched to
Blacks stopped, and Hispanics searched to Hispanics stopped, rather than
suspects searched by race to total population of everyone stopped, to
avoid contamination of racial composition of the population under exam-
ination. Also, owing to the infirmities plaguing the search variable for
years 2000 and 2001, supra, search rates will be confined to the years 2002
and 2003. Search rates were as follows:
Year 2002:
Whites: 39,193/628,452 = 6.24 percent
Blacks: 9,425/95,538 = 9.90 percent
Hispanics: 22,682/244,972 = 9.30 percent
Year 2003 Citations:
Whites: 45,550/700,027 = 6.51 percent
Blacks: 9,774/103,009 = 9.49 percent
Hispanics: 43,022/272,621 = 15.78 percent
Year 2003 Warnings:
Whites: 5,917/739,321 = 0.80 percent
Blacks: 2,250/95,119 = 2.37 percent
Hispanics: 6,232/216,315 = 2.88 = percent
Decision rule is to reject H0 if Z > 1.645.
Difference of proportions testing yields the following test statistics:
Year 2002:
Blacks to Whites:
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(0.099-0.062)
Z= -42.09 Reject the null. P = 0.00
(0.067*0.933) +6495,538 628,452
Hispanics to Whites:
(0.093-0.062)
Z -50.03 Reject the null. P = 0.00
(0.071"0.929) - + -( 244,972 628,452
Year 2003 Citations:
Blacks to Whites:
(0.095-0.065)
Z = = -35.51 Reject the null. P = 0.00
(0.069*0.931) 
1, + 7S 03,009 700,027
Hispanics to Whites:
(0.158-0.065)
Z -- 143.18 Reject the null. P = 0.00
(0.091"0.909) 
6 + 7 1S272, 21 700,027
Year 2003 Warnings:
Blacks to Whites:
(0.024-0.008)
Z- -47.10 Reject the null. P = 0.00
(0.009*0.991) [, +73
S95,119 739,321
Hispanics to Whites:
(0.029-0.008)
Z= -76.56 Reject the null. P = 0.00
(0.013*0.987) [ , +7,
S216,315 739,321
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AS TO PROPORTIONALITY OF SEARCHES
(GIVEN STOPPED) BY RACE:
For both years, for all three races, the z scores greatly exceed the criti-
cal value of 1.645. The null hypotheses of no statistically significant dif-
ference in proportions of search rates by race are rejected; and the
rejection is highly significant. There is practically zero probability of
Type I error, or incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis. For both years,
Blacks and Hispanics were searched at disproportionately higher rates
than their White counterparts, where all else other than race being equal.
A. Hypotheses Numbers Five and Six (Restated):
1105 :P contraband on blacks > P contraband on whites All else being equal, if racial
profiling does not exist, then given a search, the proportion of find-
ing contraband on Blacks will be greater than or equal to the propor-
tion of finding contraband on Whites.
Ha5 :P contraband on blacks < P contraband on whites All else being equal, if racial
profiling does exist, then given a search, the proportion of finding
contraband on Blacks will be less than the proportion of finding con-
traband on Whites.
106 :P contraband on Hispanics P contraband on whites All else being equal, if racial
profiling does not exist, then given a search, the proportion of find-
ing contraband on Hispanics will be greater than or equal to the pro-
portion of finding contraband on Whites.
Ha6 :P contraband on Hispanics < P contraband on whites All else being equal, if racial
profiling does exist, then given a search, the proportion of finding
contraband on Hispanics will be less than the proportion of finding
contraband on Whites.
To test these hypotheses, first, hit rates have been determined by taking
the ratio of contraband found on suspects searched by race, then per-
forming difference of proportions tests for contraband on Blacks versus
contraband on Whites, and Hispanics versus Whites. Hit rates were
blocked by each racial group, i.e., contraband found on Whites to Whites
searched, contraband found on Blacks to Blacks searched, and contra-
band found on Hispanics to Hispanics searched. Also, owing to the infir-
mities plaguing the search variable for years 2000 and 2001, supra, hit
rates will be confined to the years 2002 and 2003. Hit rates were as
follows:
Year 2002:
Whites: 15,722/39,193 = 40.11%
Blacks : 3,948/9,425 = 41.89%
Hispanics: 5,420/22,682 = 23.90%
2006]
THE SCHOLAR
Year 2003 Citations:
Whites: 17,140/45,550 = 37.63%
Blacks : 3,950/9,774 = 40.41%
Hispanics: 5,932/43,022 = 13.79%
Year 2003 Warnings:
Whites: 610/5,917 = 10.31%
Blacks : 295/2,250 = 13.11%
Hispanics: 244/6,232 = 3.92%
Decision rule is to reject the null if Z < -1.645.
Difference of proportions testing yields the following test statistics:
2002:
Blacks to Whites:
(0.419-0.401)
Z 
-3.16 Do not reject null.
(0.405*0.595) 92+319,425 39,193
Hispanics to Whites:
(0.239-0.401)
Z= -40.97 Reject the null. P = 0.00.
(0.342*0.658) [ +
S22,682 39,193
2003 Citations:
Blacks to Whites:
(0.404-0.376)
Z -5.13 Do not reject null.
(0.381*0.619) 9 +9,774 45,550
Hispanics to Whites:
(0.138-0.376)
Z= 
-80.79 Reject the null. P = 0.00.
(0.260*0.740) 4 +4
S43,022 45,550
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2003 Warnings:
Blacks to Whites:
(0.131-0.103)
Z= -3.60 Do not reject null.
(0.111*0.889) [2+--2,250 5,917
Hispanics to Whites:
(0.039-0.103)
Z= -13.77 Reject the null. P = 0.00.1 [1 11
(0.070*0.930) - +-[ 6,232 5,917
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AS TO PROPORTIONALITY OF FINDING
CONTRABAND (GIVEN SEARCHED) BY RACE
Just by "eyeballing" the figures for both years, one can conclude that
Blacks and Whites share very similar hit rates. This is true despite that
for both years the null hypothesis, of finding contraband on Blacks is
equal to or greater than for Whites, is not rejected. The significance of
this is that although Blacks do exhibit marginally higher hit rates than
Whites, the difference is not statistically significant. This is also true de-
spite the fact that Blacks exhibit higher search rates than Whites for both
years, further corroborating racial disparity between them.
For Hispanics, the null hypothesis is soundly rejected, and there is es-
sentially no probability of committing Type I error by falsely rejecting it.
The significance of these findings, and they are strong, is that the propor-
tions of finding contraband on Hispanics are less than that for Whites,
despite the fact that Hispanics endured much higher search rates than
either Whites for both years. The conclusion is that racial disparity in
search to hit rates exists between Whites and Hispanics.
A. The Logic of Logit
The purpose of regression analysis is to seek, through quantification,
causal relationships of explanatory variables (independent variables)
upon effect variables (dependent variables). The rationale is to hold con-
stant (such as at their means) factors other than the explanatory variables
of interest (such as age or sex), which might also affect the dependent
variable. The explanatory variables of interest are allowed to vary. Here
the explanatory variables of interest are Black, Hispanic, and specific in-
teractions of them with age, sex, and out-of-state status. White is the base
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case against which Blacks and Hispanics are compared; under thirty year
olds are compared to over thirty year olds; out-of-state is compared to
Texas residents; and interaction terms are compared to their White
counterparts.
The best way to measure racial profiling on the highways would be to
conduct a true social experiment.518 The ideal experiment would entail, a
Black male and a White male of the same age and physical stature to
drive down the same highway at the same time at the same speed in the
same year and model vehicle, exhibiting the same driving mannerisms,
and then record who was stopped and searched more often. For obvious
reasons, this would be expensive and cumbersome. Moreover, in the so-
cial sciences, true experiments on human subjects, for ethical reasons, are
often impractical or forbidden. Here, for instance, one or both drivers
would be exposed to an inordinately large amount of accidents, traffic
tickets, and arrests. In racial profiling literature, some authors have pro-
posed or attempted to conduct quasi-social experiments, like physically
observing troopers on the road,519 or have never implemented tests, such
as "triangulated" data collection.52° Under current constraints, a more
practical approach is to use secondary data collected by public officials
charged by law with that responsibility, then performing regression analy-
sis on the data to test for causal relationships.
As an example, to test their hypotheses about probability of mortgage
loan performance, "such as loan profitability," or the probability that a
borrower will not default, Ross and Yinger designed a logit model.521
Like the model in this study, any initiative of this sort is going to be an ex
post facto snapshot of what the data have revealed in the past. It is retro-
spective in nature.
Ross and Yinger were interested in measuring predictability of loan
performance, which they denominated "P," based upon past perform-
ance.5 22 In their model, "P" was a continuous variable, or credit score, so
that the higher the score, the higher the probability that a loan would
perform (not default). To determine probability of racial profiling, the
dependent variable must be quantified other than continuous. Due to the
nature of the data, the dependent variable must be binary - 1 or 0. One is
a successful occurrence - a search, or discovery of contraband, and zero is
just the opposite - a non-occurrence. Instead of "P," the logit model em-
ployed here denotes 1 as the probability of being searched, or finding
518. Grogger & Ridgeway, supra note 39, at 5-6.
519. Id.
520. Lundman & Kaufman, supra note 102, at 214.
521. See Ross & YINGER, supra note 64, at 278.
522. Id.
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contraband, and X1 to X, as a column vector of explanatory (indepen-
dent) variables that a DPS trooper might employ in deciding whether or
not to search. Again, in Ross and Yinger's model, these variables are
continuous; but in the present model they are binary.523 The betas, or
coefficients of interest, reflect a mathematical measure of how much
probability increases or decreases whenever a subject is of a particular
race or ethnicity, while holding variables other than race constant. It is
important to remember that independent variables, like the dependent
variables, are coded 0 or 1 only for quantification purposes. There is no
normative value attributed to whether one is White, Black, or Hispanic.
Ross and Yinger aggregated racial minorities into a single independent
variable, "M," denoting minority status; but this model for racial profiling
refrains from doing that, since it is interested in differentiating treatment
among discrete racial groups.5 24 Moreover, specific data to examine
those differences among the major three racial groups exist. Combining
terms, the racial profiling logit model is written:
J
Searchi = a + Yl Black i + Y2 Hispanic i + 5?ji + Ei
j= 1
where a is a constant intercept; yl and Y2 are parameters representing
slope (degree) of the binary variables; Xj is a column vector of j indepen-
dent variables for i observations; Pj is the estimated slope of the Xj vari-
ables; and E is an error term. The symbol A (read "hat") simply means
that [3 is an estimator, rather than an exactitude. The binary independent
variables of interest are Black and Hispanic, and interaction terms of
them. The higher the positive value of each racial coefficient, the more
significant it is in the decision to search.
The methodology used in this study was to select search as the depen-
dent variable with 1 for the occurrence of a search, and 0 for none. Inde-
pendent binary variables are as follows. Race was first. Of the six
categories of race/ethnicity in the database, only "White" was dropped as
the comparison case to avoid collinearity; and although "Asian," "In-
dian," and "Unknown" were included in the regression, for simplicity,
they were redacted from the results reported in the Tables. Other explan-
atory variables included in the regression as controls were "Out-of-
State," "Male," and the following interaction terms: "Out-of-State His-
panic," "Out-of-State Black," "Black Male," "Hispanic Male," "Young
Black" (under thirty years old), and "Young Hispanic" (under thirty
years old). A constant (intercept) is also included. In the case of binary
523. Id.
524. ld.
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variables, a one unit discrete change from 0 to 1, or vice versa, means, for
example, switching from White to Black or White to Hispanic.
Logit coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, since they reflect a
relationship between the coefficients (Pjs) and the unobservable latent na-
ture of the dependent variable (y). Latency is defined as an "underlying
propensity" of an event to occur, 525 but the propensity is by nature unob-
servable.526 Nevertheless, at some point the threshold of the event occur-
ring is crossed.527 For example, it may be that being Black or Hispanic as
opposed to White increases (or decreases) the probability of being
searched, but at what point does that occur? If one is either Black or
Hispanic, the threshold is breached; but the precise point of breach is
unclear. The dependent variable is measured as either 0 for not crossed,
or 1 for crossed. Mathematically, this is expressed as
Yi = 1 1if y* >< T
where y* is the latent dependent variable, and T is the threshold. Any
observations greater than T equal 1, observations less than T equal 0.528
For this reason, although the state of race may have an independent ef-
fect upon search, because it is latent, the logit results cannot be inter-
preted directly. As Long observes, "Pr(y = 1 I x) is an estimable
function." '529 That is, the probability that a search or discovery of contra-
band occurs, given a vector of independent variables, can only be esti-
mated by logit.
In the present model, when transitioning from 0 to 1, care must be
taken that the probability of an event occurring does not exceed 1 (a one
hundred percent probability) or go less than 0 (no probability). The
boundaries of range of the dependent variable, either 0 or 1, in other
words, cannot be breached. For a discrete change in binary variables, the
mathematical equation may be expressed as
A [Pr(y = 1 1 i, Xk = 1) - Pr(y = 1 i, Xk = 0)]
or the change in probability of the event occurring given observation Xk
going from 0 (non-existence of the condition) to 1 (existence of the condi-
tion), holding all other independent variables equal at their mean.530
Another way of interpreting logit results is by looking at a change in
the odds of an event occurring. "Odds" is defined as the ratio of
525. See LONG, supra note 509, at 40.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 41.
529. Id. at 49.
530. See LONG, supra note 509, at 78.
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probabilities, 531 here for example, of occurrence of the event (numerator)
over non-occurrence of the event (denominator). Again, according to
Long (1997), this may be expressed mathematically as:
Pr(y= 1 x) Pr(y=l I x)
Pr(y = 0 x) 1-Pr(y =1 ] x)
or the probability of y happening, given the column vector of x, divided
by the probability of y not happening, given the column vector of x. This
equation is equal to the probability divided by 1 minus the probability;
which would be the odds of something happening. Thus, for a unit
change in Xk, 3 changes in natural log odds, holding all other independent
variables constant. Expressed mathematically, this is
InP) X + E.
Another, perhaps somewhat more intuitive, way of interpreting logit
results is by looking at the change in odds of something happening when
Xk changes by some degree 6, which requires exponentiating the 3s; thus
producing the odds ratio when, for example, a detainee goes from being
White to Black or Hispanic. Expressed mathematically: ep; or for a single
unit change 8 in Xk, the odds change (increase or decrease) by the expo-
nential value of beta (e), all other things being equal. Here then, if a
detainee goes from White to Black or Hispanic, the odds of being
searched, or discovery of contraband, change by the exponentiated value
of the coefficient of interest (race). If ePk > 1, then the odds increase by
e k; if e k < 1, the odds decrease by e k. Statewide logit results follow:
1. Statewide Logit Results
2002
Descriptive statistics for independent variables:
531. Id. at 59.
2006]
[Vol. 8:117THE SCHOLAR
TABLE 4.6
2002 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable
Black
Hispanic
Out of State
Out of State Black
Out of State Hispanic
Male
Black Male
Hispanic Male
Under 30
Black under 30
Hispanic under 30
Observations
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
.0967
.2473
.1593
.0192
.0464
.7163
.0676
.1881
.4907
.0451
.1313
Standard Deviation
.2955
.4315
.3660
.1372
.2104
.4508
.2510
.3901
.4999
.2075
.3378
987,186
0
1
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TABLE 4.7
2002 SEARCH
Coefficient Odds Ratio Discrete Change
Black .032 1.032 .0022
(0.26)
Hispanic .283 1.327 .0207
(3.43)**
Out of State .282 1.326 .0213
(14.79)**
Out of State Hispanic .351 1.420 .0278
(12.77)**
Out of State Black .343 1.409 .0273
(9.15)**
Male .823 2.278 .0502
(44.61)**
Black Male .308 1.361 .0239
(6.92)**
Hispanic Male .017 1.017 .0012
(0.51)
Under 30 .278 1.320 .0172
(5.54)**
Black under 30 .179 1.20 .0132
(1.56)
Hispanic under 30 -. 057 .944 -. 0039
(-0.74)
Constant -3.53
(-67.78)**
Observations 497,642
Z scores in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Interpretation:
In 2002, Hispanics were more likely than Whites to be searched, given
a stop by DPS. For Blacks, the race coefficient alone was statistically
insignificant at even the ten percent level; but when combined with inter-
action terms for male, under thirty, or out-of-state, Blacks exhibit higher
probability for search than for Whites.
For Hispanics, odds of being searched were about 33 percent higher
than for Whites. If one were Hispanic, the discrete change for probability
of being searched increased by about .02 (two percentage points) com-
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pared to Whites, and the results were highly significant at the 99 percent
level. Odds of out-of-state motorists being searched were almost a third
(32.6%) higher than for Texas residents; and the discrete change of being
searched increased by about two percentage points than if one were a
Texas resident. All results for the out-of-state coefficient and racial inter-
action terms were very highly significant.
Males were more than twice as likely to be searched than females.
Black males were 34 percent (.032+.308) more likely to be searched than
White males; Hispanic males were 30 percent (.283+.017) more likely to
be searched than White males.
Out-of-state Blacks were 37.5 percent (.032+.343) more likely to be
searched than out-of-state Whites; and out-of-state Hispanics were 63.4
(.283+.351) percent more likely to be searched than out-of-state Whites.
Young motorists (under thirty) were about one-third more likely to be
searched than drivers over thirty. Blacks under thirty were 21 percent
(.179+.032) more likely to be searched than Whites under thirty; and His-
panics under thirty were 22.6 percent (.283-.057) more likely to be
searched than Whites under thirty.
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TABLE 4.8
2002 CONTRABAND
Coefficient Odds Ratio Discrete Change
Black -. 024 .976 -. 0056
(-0.10)
Hispanic -. 920 .398 -. 2024
(-5.07)**
Out of State .133 1.142 .0312
(3.64)**
Out of State Hispanic -. 371 .690 -. 0827
(-6.59)**
Out of State Black .177 1.193 .0419
(2.55)**
Male .057 1.058 .0131
(1.55)
Black Male -. 027 .973 -. 0064
(-0.31)
Hispanic Male .337 1.400 .0800
(4.55)**
Under 30 .317 1.373 .0705
(3.13)**
Black under 30 -. 035 .965 -. 0082
(-0.16)
Hispanic under 30 -. 092 .913 -. 0212
(-0.54)
Constant -. 634
(-6.04)**
Observations 40,870
Z scores in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Interpretation:
In 2002, for the discovery of contraband, racial coefficients for Blacks
and Hispanics are negative, implying there is less likelihood of discover-
ing contraband on them than Whites, given a search; albeit the Black co-
efficient alone is insignificant at the ten percent level, but highly
significant for Hispanics. Odds of contraband being discovered on out-
of-state motorists are only about 14 percent higher than for in-state re-
sidents. For out-of-state Blacks, odds of finding contraband, given a
search, were about 15.3 percent (.177-.024) higher than for out-of-state
2006)
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Whites. For out-of-state Hispanics, odds of finding contraband were
lower more than twice (-.920+-.371=1.291) than for out-of-state Whites.
Males were about equally likely to be found with contraband as females.
For Black males, contraband results were statistically insignificant. For
Hispanic males, odds of finding contraband were about 58.3 percent
(.337-.920) lower than for White males. As for the age variable, odds of
finding contraband on drivers under thirty were about 37 percent higher
than for those over thirty, and interaction terms of under thirty Blacks
and Hispanics were statistically insignificant at even the ten percent level.
2. 2003 Citations
Descriptive statistics for independent variables:
TABLE 4.9
2003 CITATIONS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Black .0941 .2919
Hispanic .2483 .4320
Out of State .1588 .3655
Out of State Black .0176 .1315
Out of State Hispanic .0484 .2146
Male .7115 .4531
Black Male .0653 .2471
Hispanic Male .1878 .3903
Under 30 .4811 .4996
Black under 30 .0432 .2034
Hispanic under 30 .1295 .3357
Observations 1,094,401
Minimum 0
Maximum 1
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TABLE 4.10
2003 CITATIONS SEARCH
Coefficient Odds Ratio Discrete Change
Black .0211 1.021 .0016
(0.64)
Hispanic 1.219 3.384 .1180
(66.42)**
Out of State .175 1.192 .0136
(13.27)**
Out of State Hispanic .322 1.380 .0267
(17.85)**
Out of State Black .261 1.298 .0213
(9.31)**
Male .681 1.976 .0448
(55.25)**
Black Male .349 1.418 .0291
(10.86)**
Hispanic Male -. 314 .7302 -. 0213
(-17.31)**
Under 30 .290 1.337 .0215
(29.77)**
Black under 30 .076 1.079 .0057
(3.20)**
Hispanic under 30 -. 184 .8319 -. 0128
(-12.73)**
Constant -3.50
(-268.54)**
Observations 1,094,401
Z scores in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Interpretation:
As in 2002, for the 2003 citation database, Blacks appeared to be mar-
ginally more likely to be searched than Whites, but the logit results were
statistically insignificant at even the ten percent level for the Black varia-
ble alone. Hispanics were almost three and one-half times more likely
than Whites to be searched, and the results were highly significant at the
.01 level. The discrete change going from White to Hispanic increased
the likelihood of being searched by almost 12 percentage points. Out-of-
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state motorists were 19 percent more likely than Texas residents to be
searched.
Out-of-state Blacks were 28 percent (.261+.021) more likely to be
searched than out-of-state Whites. Out-of-state Hispanics were almost
three times (.322+1.219=1.541) more likely to be searched than out-of-
state Whites. Males were twice (1.976) as likely to be searched than fe-
males. Black males were 37 percent (.349+.021) more likely to be
searched than White males; and Hispanic males were 90 percent (1.219-
.314) more likely to be searched than White males.
Drivers under thirty were one-third more likely to be searched than
those over thirty. Blacks under thirty were about 10 percent (.097) more
likely to be searched than Whites under thirty. Hispanics under thirty
were twice (1.035) as likely to be searched than Whites under thirty.
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TABLE 4.11
2003 CITATIONS CONTRABAND
Coefficient Odds Ratio Discrete Change
Black .106 1.111 .0203
(1.62)
Hispanic -1.100 .136 -. 3454
(-37.60)**
Out of State .068 1.070 .0129(2.61)**
Out of State Hispanic -. 227 .797 -. 0408
(-5.47)**
Out of State Black .101 1.106 .0195(1.90)
Male .068 1.070 .0126
(2.71)**
Black Male .084 1.088 .0161
(1.31)
Hispanic Male .778 2.177 .1536
(14.93)**
Under 30 .303 1.354 .0566
(15.53)**
Black under 30 -. 181 .834 -. 0326
(-3.95)**
Hispanic under 30 .076 1.079 .0144
(2.16)*
Constant -. 735
(-29.25)**
Observations 98,726
Z scores in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Interpretation:
For searches, given a citation in 2003, Blacks appear to have been mar-
ginally more likely than Whites to have been found in possession of con-
traband, but the results were insignificant at the five percent level.
Hispanics were much less likely to have been discovered with contraband
than Whites, and the result was very highly significant. Out-of-state mo-
torists were about equally as likely as Texas residents to have been dis-
covered with contraband. Out-of-state Blacks were about 20 percent
(.101+.106) more likely to possess contraband than out-of-state Whites;
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and out-of-state Hispanics were twice less likely to possess contraband
than out-of-state Whites.
3. 2003 Warnings
Descriptive statistics for independent variables:
TABLE 4.12
2003 WARNINGS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Black .0892 .2850
Hispanic .2028 .4021
Out of State .1587 .3654
Out of State Black .0188 .1360
Out of State Hispanic .0300 .1706
Male .6923 .4616
Black Male .0619 .2410
Hispanic Male .1536 .3606
Observations 1,066,493
Minimum 0
Maximum 1
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TABLE 4.13
2003 WARNINGS SEARCH
Coefficient Odds Ratio Discrete Change
Black .992 2.700 .0144
(14.03)**
Hispanic 1.306 3.692 .0191
(24.46)**
Out of State 1.132 3.100 .0162
(41.65)**
Out of State Hispanic -. 145 .865 .0013
(-3.72)**
Out of State Black -. 134 .874 .0012
-2.62)**
Male .958 2.607 .0078
25.79)**
Black Male .077 1.080 .0007
(1.03)
Hispanic Male -. 002 .998 -. 0000
(-0.04)
Constant -5.84
Observations 1,066,493
Z scores in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Interpretation:
The age variable is absent from the warnings data because no dates of
birth were recorded. Blacks were almost three times as likely as Whites
to be searched, Hispanics almost four times. Being Black meant a dis-
crete increase in the odds of being searched by 1.4 percentage points; and
being Hispanic meant a discrete increase by 1.9 percentage points. Males
were two and a half times as likely to be searched than females. Black
males were twice as likely (.077+.992=1.069) to be searched than White
males. Hispanic males were more than twice as likely (1.306-.002=1.304)
to be searched than White males.
Out-of-state motorists were three times as likely as in-state residents to
be searched. Out-of-state Blacks were almost 86 percent (.992-.134)
more likely to be searched than out-of-state Whites. Out-of-state His-
panics were more than twice as likely (1.161) to be searched than out-of-
state Whites.
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TABLE 4.14
2003 WARNINGS CONTRABAND
Coefficient Odds Ratio Discrete Change
Black .099 1.105 .0066
(0.49)
Hispanic -1.075 .341 -. 0668
(-5.23)**
Out of State -. 262 .769 -. 0164
(-2.87)**
Out of State Hispanic .345 1.412 .0248
(2.08)*
Out of State Black .263 1.301 .0187
(1.69)
Male -. 339 .713 -. 0244
(-3.05)**
Black Male .104 1.110 .0069
(0.50)
Hispanic Male -. 076 .927 -. 0049
(-0.35)
Constant -1.788
(-17.27)**
Observations 14,576
Z scores in parentheses
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Interpretation:
Blacks are about as equally as likely as Whites to be found possessing
contraband, but the results are insignificant at the five percent level. His-
panics are less likely, about 65 percent less likely, than Whites to be
found possessing contraband. Out-of-state motorists are about 20 per-
cent less likely than Texas residents to be found in possession; out-of-
state Blacks are about 36 percent (.099+.263) more likely than out-of-
state Whites to be found with contraband, but both the Black and out-of-
state Black coefficients are insignificant. Out-of-state Hispanics are al-
most 75 percent (.345-1.075) percent less likely than out-of-state Whites
to be in possession, and both the Hispanic and out-of-state Hispanic coef-
ficients are significant. Males are less likely than females to have been
found in possession. Coefficients for Blacks, Black males and Hispanic
males were insignificant at even the 10 percent level.
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B. Summary Interpretation for All Logit Results:
The logit results confirm what the earlier cross tabulations and differ-
ence of binomial proportions tests reflect. Blacks, particularly Black
males, are searched at higher rates than White males, but they exhibit
only marginally higher, in some cases essentially the same, hit rates than
Whites, when racial coefficients are significant. Hispanics across the
board are searched at much higher rates, but exhibit much lower hit rates,
than Whites.
IX. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial prefer-
ences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today. 5
32
Search and hit rates for African-Americans and Hispanics compared to
Whites are shown here in scorecard fashion by the following tables.
TABLE 5.1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
TEST & DATA
Cross Tabulation % < WHITE > WHITE
2002
Search
Black 9.87 XX
Hispanic 9.26 XX
Contraband
Black 41.89 XX
Hispanic 23.9 XX
2003
Search
Black 6.07 XX
Hispanic 10.07 XX
Contraband
Black 35.3 XX
Hispanic 12.54 XX
532. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322-23 (2003).
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TABLE 5.2
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
TEST & DATA
Difference of Proportions Z Score < WHITE > WHITE
2002
Search
Black 42.09***
Hispanic 50.03*** XX
Contraband
Black 3.16* XX
Hispanic -40.97*** XX
2003 Citations
Search
Black 35.51*** XX
Hispanic 143.18*** XX
Contraband
Black 5.13* XX
Hispanic -80.79*** XX
2003 Warnings
Search
Black 47.10*** XX
Hispanic 76.56*** XX
Contraband
Black 3.60* XX
Hispanic -13.77*** XX
* Insignificant
** Significant at .05
*** Significant at .01
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TABLE 5.3
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
TEST & DATA
Logit Coefficient <WHITE > WHITE
2002
Search
Black .032* XX
Hispanic .238*** XX
Contraband
Black -. 024* XX
Hispanic -. 920*** XX
2003 Citations
Search .021* XX
Black 1.22*** X
Hispanic
Contraband
Black .106" XX
Hispanic -1.1*** X
2003 Warnings
Search
Black .992*** XX
Hispanic 1.31"** XX
Contraband
Black .01* XX
Hispanic -1.08"** XX
Insignificant
** Significant at .05
*** Significant at .01
To summarize, there is no statistically significant evidence of dispropor-
tion in stops among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, with the reservation
of possible downward bias due to the Highway Patrol Division's presence
primarily on rural roads. When racial coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant, Blacks are searched at higher rates than Whites; although they ex-
hibit essentially equivalent hit rates to Whites. At a minimum, this is
evidence of what Knowles, Persico and Todd would call statistical profil-
ing.533 Hispanics are searched at much higher rates than Whites, but ex-
hibit much lower hit rates. From these results, it can be inferred that
while Blacks may suffer statistical profiling, a definite pattern of racial
profiling is evident against Hispanics; in that they are, and are much more
533. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 109, at 205.
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likely to be searched than Whites, but are less likely to possess and actu-
ally less often do possess contraband than Whites. In the words of Her-
nindez and Knowles, this could be indicative of "taste-based"
discrimination against them.5
34
As these results indicate, data collection on stops and searches by race
is an "essential" first step in the right direction.535 Nevertheless, room is
left for improvement. Under current Fourteenth Amendment doctrine,
proof of animus is required; but if animus is not present (at least in a
conscious state), a judicial remedy may be beyond the pale of adequately
addressing the problem at the institutional level.5 36 That may more prop-
erly lie in cultural and political venues.
Although Texas has made significant progress, its present state of data
collection would be vastly improved by expansion and greater specificity.
The first area for improvement is in recording probable cause for search.
As it is, the data simply reflect probable cause for search in a global
sense. Thus, probable cause is treated as an independent variable by it-
self as an explanation leading to a decision to search (the dependent vari-
able). But what constitutes probable cause is not really an unobservable
variable necessarily relegated to the error term in an econometric equa-
tion. Probable cause is not an independent variable at all; it is a depen-
dent variable contingent upon independent variables such as (1) objects
in plain view, (2) heavily tinted windows, (3) suspicious odors, (4) blood-
shot eyes, (5) slurred speech, and an array of others that are subject to
dichotomous quantification, in lieu of lumping them together under the
general rubric of probable cause.5 37 A trooper could record the type of
probable cause he or she had to search, which would move the present
unobservable variables, or at least some of them, from the error term into
the explanatory variable matrix, allowing researchers to control them.
After all, in a court of law a trooper cannot justify a search simply by
testifying he or she had probable cause.538 Explication of the exact type
534. Hernandez-Murillo & Knowles, supra note 126, at 965.
535. Gross & Barnes, supra note 326, at 656.
536. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 466 (3rd Cir. 1992) (citing Andrews
v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3rd Cir. 1990)).
537. These variables are generally accepted by courts as "factors" an officer may take
into consideration when finding probable cause to search. See United States v. White, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 721, at *2-3 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. MacKey, 149 Fed. Appx.
874, 878 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Rhodes, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18701, at *2 (10th Cir. 1994); Pecsenye v.
Village of Park Forrest, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
538. The ulterior motives of officers are not usually relevant in assessing the reasona-
bleness of a search. Reasonableness is determined by an "ordinary" Fourth Amendment
analysis. This involves "an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts
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or nature of cause is required.539 Lucidity of this variable would be intro-
duced into the data if probable cause were transformed into a dependent
variable explained by the host of independent variables troopers already
needed to justify a search warrant, or in-court testimony. This additional
burden on law enforcement therefore does not seem to be onerous. For
the researcher, this additional specificity would be valuable in pondering
suspected existence of pretext, a danger always lurking beneath discrimi-
nation defenses. It is recommended that any revision to the racial profil-
ing statutes mandate greater specificity of probable cause.
A second recommendation is that consent to search be written. This
issue has generated skepticism among civil liberties advocates that in cer-
tain circumstances consent had actually been given, thereby casting doubt
upon testimony of a trooper that consent was voluntary.540 Some advo-
cacy coalitions have gone so far as to propose abolition of consensual
searches.541 Without going to that extreme, it does seem the data pertain-
ing to consent would be less refutable if consent were written; as an ad-
junct to that, voluntariness of consent would be less dubious.542
A serious lacuna in the way data are collected in Texas lies in the uni-
formity of the data collection process itself.5 43 This is particularly troub-
lesome; and like consensual searches, has generated policy debate.544
This issue, however, pales all the rest. A major deficiency with racial data
collection in Texas is that the mandates of Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure are so abstruse that too much discretion remains with local law en-
forcement agencies as to how, or even whether, they collect the data.545
As Lundman and Kaufman 546 pointed out, in most, if not all, jurisdic-
tions, law enforcement is the only data collector, leaving itself subject to
the criticism of Sir Josiah Stamp that the data collector puts down what
and circumstances then known to him." See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137
(1978).
539. It seems logical that if an officer must demonstrate "the facts and circumstances
then known to him" for an "objective assessment" then the exact nature of those facts and
circumstances must be presented. Otherwise how could a court reach a decision as to
reasonableness? See Scott, 436 U.S. at 137.
540. See, e.g., TOTMAN & STEWARD, supra note 21, at 10.
541. Id.
542. The City of Austin's Police Department has implemented such a policy, and the
result has been a sixty-three percent decline in the number of consent searches. See id.
543. For an overview of the differences in data collection and reporting among Texas
law enforcement agencies see, STEWARD RESEARCH GROUP, RACIAL PROFILING: TEXAS
TRAFFIC STOPS & SEARCHES 4 (2004), available at http://www.txlulac.org/Downloads/racial
profilingreport.pdf.
544. Id. at 6-8.
545. Id. at 4 (2004); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(b)(6) (Vernon
2005); TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.133 (Vernon 2005).
546. Lundman & Kaufman, supra note 102, at 199.
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he "damn pleases." '547 So long as this statutory deficiency exists, statistics
on racial profiling will always be vulnerable to rejoinders from law en-
forcement, as evident earlier, that the data are inconclusive.54
8
At minimum, this is an appearance of a conflict of interest, if not a real
one, for law enforcement. Because law enforcement officers self-report,
there is always the temptation to be less than accurate, lest they implicate
themselves. 549 Even given the good reputation for truth and veracity of
most law enforcement officials, there still exists at least the appearance of
a conflict of interest, which should be avoided if law enforcement is to
maintain confidence in the court of public opinion; which it must.55° Lo-
cal law enforcement agencies which wield this magnitude of discretion
include not just local self-rule municipalities, but also unincorporated ju-
risdictions usually served by county sheriffs and constables, not to men-
tion scads of autonomous jurisdictions, such as regional transit
authorities, school police, and airport authorities. 55' All are the sole data
collectors charged with this vital enforcement function of the racial profil-
ing statutes. 2 At the present, however, compliance ranges all the way
from good faith efforts on par with the Texas Department of Public
Safety to outright refusal to collect data at all, because in the judgment of
some local officials it is not required.553 It is, therefore, recommended
that existing racial profiling statutes be amended to divest some, if not all,
discretion of law enforcement agencies from the mandate of collecting
racial data, and how it is recorded.
The videotaping exemption from the requirement of quantitative data
collection, article 2.135, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, must be clari-
fied or repealed so as to require either quantitative data recording, or
both quantitative recording and videotaping. This exemption is little dif-
ferent from the overly broad discretion vested in the exclusive data col-
lectors, because it opens a wide loophole. First, videotaping alone is an
inferior substitute for quantitative data collection, in that it is of little use
to researchers in any statistical analysis. To be useful, video data must be
in quantifiable form, or at least able to be put in that form, a potentially
dubious, and definitely time-consuming and expensive process. Second,
the videotaping exemption allows agencies to opt out of the data collec-
547. Id.; see also STAMP, supra note 493, at 258-59.
548. Lundman and Kaufman report that as of 2003, several police departments had
already been caught falsifying data. See Lundman & Kaufman, supra note 102, at 199.
549. Id.
550. Carrick stresses this heavily. See Carrick, supra note 180, at 10.
551. All of these entities are "law enforcement agencies" subject to the Texas Racial
Profiling Act. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(a)(1) (Vernon 2005).
552. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132(b)(6) (Vernon 2005).
553. See Cops REPORT, supra note 42, at 100.
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tion process altogether, both at the individual officer and the agency
level, if video equipment is deployed." 4 This essentially negates the stat-
utory data collection mandate, thereby nullifying its entire public policy
of banning racial profiling. If the exclusive data collectors are exempt
from data collection, no one is left to perform this vital task. Finally, even
if eventually able to be quantified, videotaped data is of dubious value, in
that it is subject to bias injected via human interpretation at the input
stage. Individual officers present on the scene are eminently better quali-
fied to make decisions about race or skin color of a detainee than are
third party technicians viewing grainy, blurry, or inaudible films in an ex
post facto setting. The opportunity for bias, intentional or unintentional,
is simply too great to be acceptable in a serious public policy context.
The DPS is to be commended for its internal regulation requiring both
videotaped and recorded quantifiable data, a standard that ideally should
be requisite for all Texas law enforcement agencies.555 It is, therefore, my
wholehearted recommendation that the Texas Legislature abolish the
videotaped data collection exemption from the racial profiling statutes.
Finally, the more nettlesome cultural issues of law enforcement recruit-
ment and training need to be addressed.556 Although a legislative re-
sponse to how law enforcement agencies recruit and train their troops is
possible, it should be unnecessary. Some agencies like DPS have demon-
strated they are capable of resolving these issues by themselves; while,
other agencies appear not to be so receptive.557 Recruitment and training
are legally evasive because implementation is broader than mere legisla-
tive mandate can address. They are cultural needs requiring cultural so-
lutions. Training officers to spot criminals by race, whether overtly such
as by official proclamation or by invidious implication such as in visual
aids, creates the sort of self-fulfilling prophecy that is best addressed
within the prevailing law enforcement community itself. Increased re-
cruitment of minority races into the ranks of the law enforcement com-
munity would do more to foster trust in the law than all the racial
profiling statutes combined.
The ultimate question is, what implications do these findings hold for
the Texas Department of Public Safety? Are disparities race aware or
race benign? The data and analyses reflect that while there are racial
554. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.135(a) (Vernon 2005).
555. See TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 253, at 4-6.
556. Indeed, a report compiled for the U.S. Department of Justice stated that better
recruitment and training policies are essential for the prevention of racial profiling. See
Cops REPORT, supra note 42, app. at 136-37.
557. TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 253, at 4-7; see also STEWARD RE.
SEARCH GROUP, RACIAL PROFILING: TEXAS TRAFFIC STOPS & SEARCHES 4 (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.txlulac.org/Downloads/racialprofilingreport.pdf.
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disparities in searches by DPS and hit rates by race, the data are insuffi-
cient to reach an irrefutable conclusion of racial profiling. What can be
concluded is that racial disparities on Texas highways do exist. For the
present, reforms urged include more specific data collection, augmented
minority recruitment into law enforcement, less biased training by elimi-
nating racial stereotypes, written consent to search, elimination of statu-
tory ambiguities, repeal of the videotaping exemption, and constant
vigilance whenever the apparition of racial profiling rears its undead
head.
